

eVALUatiOn Matters

A Quarterly Knowledge Publication of the Operations Evaluation Department
of the African Development Bank Group

March 2013



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*Voices from
Regional
Member Countries*



African Development Bank Group



eVALUatiOn Matters

is published quarterly in English and French

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Avwontom

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Design: Phoenixdesignaid and Felicia

Avwontom (AfDB)

Layout and Printing: Phoenixdesignaid

Cover photo: ECoP discussion on the PCR
review process

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in its regional member countries through
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From the Director's Desk

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Mohamed Manai

Evaluation Essay Contest Winners

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Quality at Entry

Voices from Regional Member Countries

THIS ISSUE OF eVALUation Matters brings you voices from AfDB regional member countries (RMC). The quality of the essays submitted for the contest launched to celebrate 25 years of evaluation at the AfDB demonstrates the wealth of RMC skills in policy and development program evaluation. (See top three essays on pages 5 to 27).

These essays showcase the state of the art evaluations carried out by African evaluators. They also highlight the extensive challenges facing evaluation in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Uganda. These challenges include: i) availability of reliable data; ii) effective involvement, early in the evaluation process, of stakeholders to foster buy-in of results; iii) effective use of lessons learned from evaluations by policy makers; iv) the important role of evaluation ‘champions’ for the effective integration of lessons learned in the design of new public policies; and v) how to communicate, using the most appropriate channels, to reach and convince policy makers of the opportunity and the need for change.

The essays also underscore that the social and institutional context in which an ‘evaluation’ evolves is important to ensure proper execution of the evaluation and actual use of its results. The key requirements for good governance—ethics, integrity and



Mohamed Manai, Manager, OPEV, AfDB

values—get their full meaning in the context of action to strengthen capacities in RMCs.

This issue of eVALUation Matters also touches on the challenges of microfinance within an institution that has identified green and inclusive growth as one of the pillars of its long-term strategy. The conversation on this topic was enriched by a team from CGAP—led by CEO Tilman Erbeck—which visited the AfDB in February 2013. On page 37, the CGAP team shares its thoughts on whether and how the Bank should intervene in the microfinance sector, understanding the needs of the poor, adopting a systemic approach to inclusive development of local financial systems, and promoting the role of actors or ‘catalysts’ such as governments

*From experience to knowledge ...
From knowledge to action
From action to impact*



Topics discussed during ECoP meetings focus on operational policy and strategic development, methodologies and practices of managing development, and evaluation of sectoral or thematic development programmes.

and international development institutions. Understanding what works from the Bank's own experience and context offers a real opportunity for the Bank's decision-makers to chart the future with confidence. This is the objective of an ongoing OPEV evaluation of the Bank's microfinance activities. The evaluation aims to identify what has worked well on the microfinance front and to make recommendations aimed at strengthening the Bank's strategy in this area (page 54).

Finally, the AfDB Evaluation Community of Practice (ECOP), launched by OPEV in 2010, is growing. It has organized several well-attended face-to-face events and has seen increasing participation by Bank staff, Executive Directors, experts, and AfDB Senior Management. To foster

continuous conversation and exchange around evaluation matters, OPEV has now taken the ECoP online by creating a network of evaluators (AfDB Evaluation Community of Practice), which is open to all Bank staff interested in evaluation for development effectiveness.

The thirst for knowledge, outreach and knowledge-sharing is encouraging. Topics discussed during ECoP meetings focus on operational policy and strategic development, development management methodologies and practices and evaluation of sectoral or thematic development programmes.

I have had the pleasure of facilitating some of the sessions, which are particularly interesting because of the variety of themes, topics, and viewpoints. Recent topics include the evaluation architecture of the Inter-American Development Bank, the use of the good practice standard in quality assurance, quality at entry of projects, inclusive finance and micro-finance for inclusive growth (see pages 63 to 71).

So, bravo to the practitioners and organizers for fostering the sharing and management of evaluation and development knowledge at the AfDB. We eagerly await forthcoming ECOP sessions and online conversations.

Happy reading!

Evaluatively Yours,

Mohamed Hedi Manai,

Division Manager, OPEV

Essay
Contest
Winner
1st Place

Real World African Evaluations in Africa

—that made a Difference

“Do and can Development Evaluations make a Difference? The case of the Strategy & Policy Unit Project, Sierra Leone.”

Sylvia Apreku



The Backdrop

“**PROJECT MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES** do not necessarily end with the physical completion of an industrial project. A number of loose but important ends usually need to be tied up” (Dennis Lock 1996).

A terminal evaluation is one of the loose ends that need to be tied up, often with a price tag of thousands and thousands of US dollars (depending on the nature, complexity and duration of the evaluation). Such price tags for development evaluations emphasize why evaluations matter for development, generally, and for Africa’s development in particular.

Henceforth, the value of development evaluations speaks for itself. With the ultimate quest for prosperity and growth, most evaluation terms of reference and reports will reflect the assessment criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and at times impact or partnerships for any given development intervention. Although numerous evaluations have taken place over the period and across space, year in-year out, stagnation has persisted on the African continent. This raises the following basic question: what policy-making processes and programme interventions

are most likely to bring about sustainable growth and prosperity for Africa, particularly with development evaluations at the forefront?

According to a World Bank report (1994), over the last fifty years, Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen behind the rest of the world: Its average GDP per capita was lower than 30 years before and it was the only region in the world where poverty, as measured by the share of the population living on less than \$1 per day, had not fallen. To make matters worse, Africa’s share in world trade had declined and the continent had the highest incidence of HIV infection.



Over the last fifty years, Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen behind the rest of the world. Its average GDP per capita was lower than 30 years before and it was the only region in the world where poverty, as measured by the share of the population living on less than \$1 per day, had not fallen.

Governments and development partners responded to this situation by renewing their commitment through country-specific initiatives like NEPAD, MDGs, and PRSPs. Nonetheless, effective action for prosperity and development in Africa will require adequate understanding of the nature of the problem. Development evaluations, if done and used effectively, can provide the necessary building blocks and stepping stones for tackling the development challenges Africa faces.

But the question that needs to be asked is: What factors have contributed to under-utilization of evaluation findings and how can utilization of evaluation findings be enhanced?

This essay argues that unleashing the potential of utilizing findings of development evaluations is a practical path to designing effective development policies, projects, strategies, practices, governance processes and mechanisms. This path, if accorded a pragmatic approach and commitment, will ultimately lead to sustainable social economic development in African countries. The essay draws

on the experience of the Strategy & Policy Unit (SPU) project, under the Office of the President (OoP) in Sierra Leone, where the President called for an evaluation of the SPU project to draw lessons within the overall process of realigning the country's public service.


The essay is divided into six sections: **Section 2** focuses on 'why the strategy and policy unit (SPU) project' was chosen—to ensure a shared understanding of the background and rationale for establishing the SPU project. **Section 3** presents the evaluation findings and the key strategic stakeholder decisions. **Section 4** discusses utilization of the evaluation findings and some emerging recommendations that have been implemented successfully. **Section 5** spells out the specific elements that helped make a difference in this evaluation. **Section 6** outlines key challenges and bottlenecks faced during the evaluation process, particularly by the evaluators. The conclusion is presented in **Section 7**, summing up with some key messages and food for thought on how utilization of evaluation findings can be enhanced.

1. Why the Strategy & Policy Unit (SPU) Project?

The background and rationale for establishing the SPU project, as articulated in the assignment's ToRs and the GoSL public sector reform programme.

Sierra Leone, having emerged from conflict, suffered from an acute shortage of highly skilled human resources. The repercussions were wide

ranging, but the consequences were most severe in policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and coordination. Furthermore, national development policies suffered from a fragmented policy-making process, which was further aggravated by weak capacity for policy analysis and coordination at the highest level.



Numerous and complementary institutions were involved in policy-making, monitoring and stakeholder coordination, all with ad hoc arrangements around the offices of the President and Vice President. As a result, the OoP had become functionally overloaded. What was critically required was a mechanism and unit that would garner national ownership, align external support around national priorities and coordinate different stakeholders-to ensure coherence and consistency

with the overall vision of the President and the priorities of the nation, as stipulated in the Agenda for Change. Henceforth, with funding from the UNDP, the SPU in the Office of the President was created to respond to this need. The SPU was set up to provide strategic policy advice; policy analysis, harmonization and coordination; implementation support; and monitoring & evaluation—that is to be core champions for the President’s Agenda for Change.

2. Evaluation Findings and Key Strategic Decisions

The evaluation findings were presented in terms of the SPU organisational set up, administrative management, role and financing. They highlighted the respective strengths and challenges vis-a-vis the SPU’s ability to deliver on its mandate. The three agreed upon and key strategic stakeholder decisions derived from the recommendations were as follows:

- The SPU needs to be formally and fully integrated into the Office of the President. Continued existence of the SPU as an externally funded project is unsustainable. An exit strategy for the external funding should be defined, with clear, time-bound commitments from both the development partners and the Government.

- The SPU’s organisational set-up and reporting relationship should be revised to better position it to deliver on its mandate. A thorough organisational restructuring is needed to rectify errors from the past. A requisite foundation for the SPU’s success will be a newly structured SPU with a clearly communicated mandate, roles and responsibility combined with a competitive and transparent recruiting process to staff the unit.
- A performance review system for SPU needs to be introduced to directly capture feedback on the group’s performance and incentivize good behaviour.

3. Utilization of Evaluation Findings and Recommendations Implemented

Addressing the evaluation findings and implementing the corresponding recommendations—that subsequently led to changes in policies, organizational strategies, practices, project design and

governance mechanism—was symbolic of effective utilization of evaluation findings in this case study. These are presented in the following section, which first outlines the challenges faced and then


the recommendation that was implemented. These evaluation findings are mainly drawn from the evaluation report (ACET 2010).

Key, and little known, was the finding that the SPU encountered institutional resistance from the civil service not only because of lack of understanding of the reason for its formation and recruitment process of the advisors, but also because of lack of civil service representation in the group. To promote it, selected civil servants known for excellence in their respective fields in the ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) were offered the opportunity for secondment to the SPU for a defined period. This was complemented by external recruitments on a contractual basis of a few highly experienced professionals for specific technical areas. The President fully endorsed and clarified in writing to all stakeholders the mandate and roles of the SPU. In turn, the SPU designed and widely publicized its new proposal and a resource mobilization strategy. As part of the restructuring recommendation, a staffing plan was developed with detailed job descriptions and all positions opened for competitive bidding. Special attention was on hiring top-notch advisors and analysts—in total, four advisors and ten analysts were hired for the new SPU (Scharf 2012).

The SPU reporting structure was not optimal for getting the necessary administrative and operational day-to-day support and synergies needed by group to deliver on its mandate. For instance, the SPU coordinator reported directly to the President and the coordinator was not considered by some

ministries as a peer or someone with the clout to question their performance. The lack of a ministerial level official to oversee the SPU's agenda on a daily basis posed a challenge to the unit's operational influence. Appointment of the chief of staff reformed the administrative management of the unit, further conveying a strong endorsement of the SPU by the President. The introduction of the Chief-of-Staff role created a central authority under the President to oversee the substantive matters of the presidency while the Secretary to the President was responsible for administrative issues. The reporting structure changed as the head of the new SPU now reported to the Chief-of staff instead of to the President. In addition, the role of programme/project manager was abolished, with the residual functions transferred to the Director and/or Head of the new SPU.

Lack of collaboration between the SPU and the other overlapping units created confusion and deprived the unit of the much-needed synergies. For example, the Cabinet Oversight and Monitoring Unit (COMU) had legal backing at the Presidency, with a mandate to follow up on cabinet decisions and monitor projects arising from cabinet decisions. The COMU, like the SPU, reported directly to the President. It is important to note that the SPU and COMU had no formal relations, though both units were involved in performance monitoring of ministries. Similarly, the Private Sector Adviser reported directly to the President and had no formal relations with the SPU. However, as a result of the evaluation recommendation, the functions of the



SPU, the COMU, and the Private Sector Adviser were consolidated into the new SPU. This resulted in one consolidated unit for technical advisory, implementation support, and performance monitoring, that better captured synergies and ensured proper coordination. This, in turn, relieved the President from being the administrative head of the units and from the day-to-day pressures that come with it. This arrangement did not preclude the President from having direct access to the advisors. The monthly presidential progress meetings aided coordination by regularly bringing together key people involved in specific flagship projects and also provided a forum for the President to know about bottlenecks and to intervene (Scharf 2012).

The SPU's original mandate was two-fold: to provide strategic policy advice and delivery support. In practice, the role was focused on the latter to the detriment of the former. The focus on delivery support translated into focus on performance tracking. There was resistance from some members of the SPU and from external stakeholders to this narrowly defined role. In addition, the SPU's exclusion from cabinet proceedings isolated it from a key policy-making platform, with far-reaching implications on its ability to deliver on policy analysis and coordination.

On the performance management side, not having access to cabinet conclusions hindered the SPU's ability to have a holistic view of pressing issues that drive minister's actions and performance. The new SPU was restructured with two clear groups within

the unit, one group focusing on analytical support and the other on delivery. New recruitments were conducted based on the necessary skills-sets for each respective group and it strengthened the unit's ability to deliver on its full mandate. Scharf (2012) notes that in an effort to refocus the SPU's delivery, the President and the Chief-of-Staff decided that one flagship project was to be selected for each of the priorities in the Agenda for Change. This yielded projects in the health, agriculture, private sector development, energy, and water resources sectors. For example, the Free Health Care Initiative, Road Building Project and the Small-Farmer programme.

Collaboration between the SPU and ministries has improved considerably, with a buy-in to utilize the flagship project tracker. The SPU director, SPU advisers and analysts meet with the Chief-of-staff, minister and other relevant ministry officials to discuss the tracker in preparation for the presidential progress meetings and briefings.

There was no clear formal performance evaluation of the SPU itself and the absence of clear accountability for the group was a disincentive for optimal performance. A rigorous performance management and monitoring process of the SPU itself was introduced to ensure that the unit learns from direct stakeholder feedback and also provides an incentive for high performance. The review process provides the unit with direct feedback to strengthen its operations and has fostered a strong collaborative spirit within the SPU. This has earned the SPU credibility and a good image.

Essay
Contest
Winner

Real World African Evaluations in Africa

—that made a Difference

The lack of a clear plan for weaning the SPU off UNDP funding posed a critical challenge to its sustainability and continuity. Furthermore, the fact that the SPU was set up as a project and not anchored in the civil service structure raised concerns about its sustainability. However, given the importance of the SPU to the Presidency, the SPU migrated from a donor project organizational structure to an institutionalized framework within the OoP.

A recommendation to align SPU remuneration with GoSL pay structure, to make it sustainable, was adopted, with concrete measures taken to shift the SPU to full Government funding with an interim joint donor funding pool. The SPU's enhanced credibility increased Government and donor interest, resulting in sustainable sources of financing being identified with funding arrangements made for the medium to the long term. In November 2010, DFID and the European Union joined with the UNDP to fund the SPU until the general elections in 2012.

Evidently, the evaluation findings also highlighted the leveraging strengths of the SPU project. The assigned coverage areas for SPU Advisors were well aligned with pillars of the Agenda for Change, thus enabling the unit to benefit from synergies in enforcing the implementation of the vision. The SPU also accomplished some successes in enhancing the Government strategy, through involvement in developing the PRSP and some policy papers.

The development of a results-based management culture was cited as one of the main accomplishments of the SPU. The performance contracts were improved as informed by the flagship project tracker. According to a UNDP Annual Report (2011), performance contracts have now been adopted by all the twenty-two ministers and sixty nine senior civil servants. This has enhanced the way government agencies plan, monitor, coordinate and report on development activities.

The collaborative platform afforded the SPU meant it was well positioned to offer implementation support; it also removed bottlenecks faced by individual ministries. Improved relations between the SPU and the ministries are a measure of the unit's success, bolstering coordination and accountability at the centre of government. The successful completion of the Bumbuna Electricity project by the Ministry of Energy is cited as one of the notable achievements of the unit in this regard. Friedman (2011) asserts that the energy and infrastructure advisor in the original SPU orchestrated regular inter-ministerial meetings, developing his own performance tracking system, and managed the project to completion and commissioning in November 2009. He further argues that this provides insights into how the effective use of a performance monitoring system can motivate employees, facilitate cooperation with government MDAs and coordination of decision-making at the centre of Government.

4. *Why the Difference in the SPU Project Evaluation?*

Some specific elements helped make a difference in the SPU project evaluation, specifically with respect to stakeholder commitment towards owning the evaluation process, findings; utilization of the findings; and implementation of the recommendations. These elements were: diverse stakeholder engagement; appropriateness of methodology and evaluation plan; management of quality assurance; non-extractive nature of the evaluation exercise; government ownership and leadership role; and the dissemination effort.

Stakeholder engagement. Constant stakeholder consultation and involvement throughout the evaluation process, right from the inception workshop, was instrumental in creating a sense of ownership for the process, findings and final recommendations. There was a consensus, shared understanding of the interviewees, that included key leaders in the Office of the President, including the President, the Vice President, key ministers and senior representatives of the donor community.

Two stakeholder meetings were organised; one with government representatives and another with the donor community. These meetings provided a forum to debate the proposed recommendations, gather insights to further enrich the recommendations; and assess their feasibility and sustainability. The broader assessment of the OoP/SPU recommendations and implementation plan were then presented to the President for approval. This

paved the way for effective utilization of the findings through coherent implementation of the agreed—upon recommendations.

The methodology and evaluation plan was appropriate and innovative, making the SPU project evaluation very strategic with the required political clout. The evaluation did not just review the SPU in isolation but as an integrated part of the overall assessment of the functionality of the Office of the President (OoP). Perhaps this functional review approach, as opposed to an SPU—specific evaluation, helped ease the animosity and defensiveness usually associated with most evaluation exercises.

Management of quality assurance. The team of evaluators had a diverse combination of expertise, ranging from policy analysts to economists, institutional/ organisation development specialists and strategic planners. The team had significant regional and global experience with the ability to



Constant stakeholder consultation and involvement throughout the evaluation process, right from the inception workshop, was instrumental in creating a sense of ownership for the process, findings and final recommendations.

drive change at senior level and centre of governments. Additionally, quality was well managed and assured as the evaluation team demonstrated an in-depth understanding of the challenges and opportunities faced by the team members and also exhibited great political sensitivity and familiarity with the West African region and with the country.

The **evaluation exercise was not extractive in nature**, the team continued to provide implementation support, particularly around senior leadership coaching and overall engagement management. In addition, the evaluators facilitated the retention of an independent evaluator to assess the impact of the changes over the period.

Government ownership and leadership. The Government, in particular, the Ministry of Presidential and Public Affairs (MPPA), took on the leadership and coordination role of the

evaluation process. Important to note, is the Government of Sierra Leone's willingness and ability to counter-fund the evaluation. These elements made a difference by creating a sense of ownership and commitment to the evaluation exercise. The norm is for donors to take the initiative and the lead in commissioning, funding and coordinating project terminal evaluations.

Efforts to ensure dissemination, publication and the use of key findings. The review emphasized the critical importance of setting a clear and commonly understood set of dissemination channels and mechanisms. Rigorous and targeted stakeholder meetings and validation workshops were a deliberate effort in ensuring timely dissemination and wide publication of the evaluation process, findings and recommendations. Constant dialogue was an important factor in the evaluation process.

5. Challenges Faced During the Evaluation Exercise

Drawing from the elements that helped make a difference in the SPU project evaluation, the following key challenges still remained and emerged: weak institutional and administrative capacities to drive evaluation exercises; vested interests and internal conflicts between key government structures creating some delays in finalizing the recommendations; and, the absence of a public sector accountability culture and mechanisms which was not conducive for the evaluation process.

In general, weak institutional and administrative capacity counts as the single most important constraint towards successful and sustained utilization of evaluation findings and implementation of the evaluation recommendations on the African continent. It must be emphasized that institutional capacity development calls for early and serious attention and investment when designing, implementing, and managing development evaluations.

6. Summing Up

Irrespective of the challenges, the SPU project evaluation made a difference. It led to a redesigned organizational set-up of the SPU; reformed administrative management of the unit and institutional coordination; strengthened the role of the SPU to deliver on its mandate; and resulted in identification of additional funding to improve the SPU's effectiveness and sustainability.

We learn here that utilization of evaluation findings can be enhanced through a back-to-basics approach with regard to (i) soliciting high level political ownership, (ii) support and commitment—as was the case with the President calling for the evaluation, and his approval of the final recommendations and implementation plan; (iii) manoeuvring for onset buy-in of the evaluation from the project team and technocrats in the civil service; (iv) maintaining the integrity, clout and thematic knowledge of the evaluation team; (v) employing tactful dissemination and sharing of sensitive findings, decisions and recommendations by using and involving key stakeholders; (vi) identifying and leveraging on pressing issues that need to be addressed urgently; and (vii) constantly monitoring and conceding to a 'gestation period' to allow 'natural timing' in embracing the recommendations and consequently implementing them.

Most importantly, the evaluation team has to work closely with the Government team to develop an implementation plan and budget, and arrange for

technical expertise to execute the plan within an overall and appropriate national reform agenda.

This essay cautions that analysing the links and positive multiplier effect between development evaluations and national prosperity is a subject that has remained relatively under-explored both analytically and in the development policy research literature. However, the essay concludes that the SPU project experience suggests that there can be virtuous cycles between development evaluations and national prosperity in multiple realms and with a positive dynamic.

Key Messages:

- National development must be driven by a clearly defined national vision, strategic direction, planning and evaluation framework.



We learn here that utilization of evaluation findings can be enhanced through a back-to-basics approach with regard to (i) soliciting high level political ownership, (ii) support and commitment—as was the case with the President calling for the evaluation, and his approval of the final recommendations and implementation plan.

Essay
Contest
Winner

Real World African Evaluations in Africa

—that made a Difference

- A National Development Agenda without political commitment is a dead agenda.
- Development evaluations should be designed and implemented within the socio-political and macroeconomic context of a given country. Therefore, successful utilization of evaluation findings may not entirely depend on what we have but on how we use what we have.
- Rethinking and enforcing institutional capacity development strategies that tackle issues of values, ethics, integrity and attitude in the public service can in itself increase awareness on the importance of development evaluations.

Food for thought:

- Why has utilization of evaluation findings been branded largely unsuccessful in Sub-Saharan Africa? What are the prerequisites for African governments to embrace evaluation exercises and utilization of evaluation findings?
- Given the time-consuming nature and high cost of development evaluations, what kind of management and funding approaches can help African government to build sustainable and effective evaluations?
- Do African governments consider development evaluations a ‘western value’ and a donor driven requirement? If so, what institutional capacity development interventions can change the status quo?
- How best and frequently can institutional capacity development interventions or projects be evaluated and measured? What could be the ideal performance measures (at outcome and output level) for measuring institutional capacity development interventions?

Excellent development evaluations have been designed and conducted on the African continent. The problem lies with stakeholder commitment towards implementation of recommendations and utilization of evaluation findings.

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Excellent development evaluations have been designed and conducted on the African continent. The problem lies with stakeholder commitment towards implementation of recommendations and utilization of evaluation findings.

Essay
Contest
Winner
2nd Place

Real World African Evaluations in Africa

—that made a Difference

An Independent Evaluation of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)

Otuku Michael

Office of the Prime Minister / Northern Uganda Social Action Fund



Introduction

THE POVERTY ERADICATION Action Plan (PEAP) was Uganda's comprehensive national development planning framework aimed at guiding public action to eradicate poverty in the country. It was introduced by the Government in 1997 in response to a recognition that the benefits of considerable growth that had been fostered in Uganda since 1986 were not, in every case, reaching those most in need. The PEAP's long-term strategic objectives included reducing income poverty and inequality, improving human development and increasing GDP growth. It was designed to span a 20-year period with the overall target of reducing the number of Ugandans unable to meet their basic needs to less than 10 per cent by 2017 from a baseline of 44 per cent recorded in the inception year.

After ten years in which two revisions of the original Plan were made, the Government of Uganda decided to commission an independent evaluation of the Plan and its implementation since inception. The timing of this evaluation was important, as it came at the mid-point towards the target of poverty reduction, but also at a time where a new five-year national development plan was being formulated.

Purpose of the Evaluation


To determine the effectiveness of the PEAP as the framework for achieving the eradication of poverty in Uganda as a basis for determining the most effective strategy for moving forwards.

Objectives of the Evaluation

- i. To determine how effective the PEAP had been as a consensus-building mechanism for the expression of national development aspirations, looking at what results had been achieved;
- ii. To determine how effective the PEAP had been in delivering results: as an instrument of prioritization, strategic resource allocation and accountability; and
- iii. To identify and highlight specific practices from the decade of Uganda's PEAP that would best inform the formulation of the third revision of the PEAP with a view to achieving the poverty eradication target by 2017.

Scope and Evaluation Questions

- Results and performance – what progress has been made against the fundamental PEAP objectives of reducing poverty?
- Political economy – what have been the relevance, ownership and leadership of PEAP?



- Institutional arrangements – how effective was the institutional framework that linked the PEAP and MDA's
- Partnership – to what extent did the PEAP increase focus, harmonization and reduction in transaction costs in dealing with different Development Partners?
- Economic Transformation and Sustainable Poverty Reduction – to what extent has the PEAP served to guide reforms in economic management and impact of investment in social sectors in terms of economic returns?

To answer these questions in an impartial and transparent manner, the Government decided to commission an independent assessment. Through a public procurement process, Oxford Policy Management Limited, United Kingdom, was selected to conduct the evaluation. The process was managed from the Government-side by a tripartite committee composed of representatives of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and the National Planning Authority, under the leadership of the Office of the Prime Minister. The committee was supported by a reference group comprising national and international experts to provide advice on methodological and content issues.

The evaluation confirmed the widely held view that the PEAP had been a critical instrument in the successful drive to reduce poverty and propel the economy forward. This success has been attributed to a combination of political will to initiate and drive the process, and prudent management in key

policy areas. However, the evaluation also notes that the gains made have not been evenly spread, with poverty in the north and east unchanged, and with challenges in the quality of education and in the provision of health care. Establishing stronger management controls, enhancing accountability not only for resources but also in their application, and harmonizing the work of key coordinating institutions are all welcome recommendations which we take very seriously.

Challenges Faced by the Evaluators in Making the Evaluation Relevant, Used, and Useful

The evaluators faced some challenges in getting all the findings of the evaluation accepted or agreed upon as Government did not agree with or rejected some of the findings and partially accepted others as presented below:

The Government did not agree with the finding that there has been fading political leadership of the PEAP as the prime instrument for achieving national aspirations during the period of the PEAP 2004. The Government stated that the poverty eradication agenda outlined in the PEAP 2004 document has been actively pursued by the political leadership through the introduction of new initiatives such as Prosperity for All, and the restructuring of existing initiatives such as the National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAADS). The Government added that these interventions were in line with the national aspirations as defined in

the PEAP, while recognizing that it has taken time to link them operationally.

One of the findings of the evaluation was that the power of the PEAP as an instrument of political prioritization weakened overtime as a result of failure of political prioritization. However, the Government did not agree with this finding, rather that new priorities were not sufficiently integrated into the PEAP. However, it did recognize that the PEAP itself was a framework rather than a plan, and hence had no detailed implementation strategy, no costing was undertaken or any budgeting. Consequently, there have been difficulties in ensuring that poverty eradication initiatives designed and implemented to achieve the PEAP objectives and outcome targets are achieved.

The Government also did not agree with the finding that there were weaknesses in collective decision-making and oversight of PEAP, particularly around the functioning of the cabinet system. The Government did, however, note that the cabinet committee system could be strengthened to play a fuller role in the decision-making and oversight of the PEAP's successor, the National Development Plan.

The Government further did not agree with the finding that as the PEAP had developed, there had been a weakening of the sense of shared interest between the Government and development partners. The Government noted that the points of engagement had shifted as the PEAP had developed, with greater emphasis placed on central


engagement behind the budget support mechanism, and in strengthening support for sectors through the sector-wide approach.

Some of the areas where the Government showed partial agreement include the following:

The Government partially agreed with the finding that the amount of attention required from senior Government managers and policy-makers did have an opportunity cost, and reduced available time to deal with other important matters. However, the Government did not believe that this was a major problem, as the evaluators had found, rather that it was one that required some attention and rationalization.

The Government partially agreed with the finding that the intense engagement of the development partners in the PEAP at the sectoral level had distracted attention from the big picture of the Government/development partner relationship around the national development strategy as defined in the PEAP. The Government, however, noted that sectoral policy papers had informed national level papers and subsequently the budget, and hence a relationship had existed between sectoral and national strategy development. The Government appreciated the efforts by development partners to divide responsibilities and rationalize their engagement with Government in line with the Paris Declaration commitments.

The evaluators also faced methodological challenges in meeting the requirements of the Terms of Reference which called for a strategic evaluation



covering the effectiveness of a broad and complex set of institutional arrangements. No single set of principles and standards existed as the basis for evaluating the PEAP. The approach adopted had been to evaluate the PEAP framework and its role and effectiveness within the Uganda Governmental system firstly against its own goals and objectives for the PEAP, and secondly against relevant local and international experience.

The evaluation also covered the impact of PEAP policies. This presented particular methodological challenges. Initially, it was hoped to focus the impact assessment work on identifying counterfactuals in order to answer the question: what outcomes would Uganda have attained in the absence of the PEAP? Four methods were suggested to identify counterfactuals to the PEAP: non-naïve before/after comparisons, with/without comparisons, simulation exercises and contribution analysis. Each method has its strengths and weaknesses, but it was hoped that by attempting to use the four approaches it would be possible to reach a balanced assessment of the PEAP's impact.

However, as the work progressed, it became increasingly clear that the approach the evaluation team had hoped to adopt was too ambitious. It became necessary to revise the original methodology in the light of data limitations, time constraints and feedback on the initial proposals: it would not be possible to undertake rigorous counterfactual analysis.

Because the data available could not support counterfactual analysis, it was decided to use contribution

analysis. A simplified version of contribution analysis was applied because it was not feasible to apply the ideal six-stage approach to all PEAP outcome indicators of interest owing to time constraints, and to the overall limitations on resources available for any particular area within the very wide and complex scope of the evaluation. However, the main objective of contribution analysis, which is to elaborate convincing evidence-based performance stories, remained as the main objective.

In light of the breadth and depth of the constraints imposed by the properties of the data and the resources available, the evaluation team's approach had been to select some policies which seemed most significant to the high-level PEAP objectives, and to make the best use of available data and information, including time series and cross-section data when appropriate. There was a strong emphasis on articulating 'performance stories', based on evidence from a variety of sources including analysis of primary data, the use of secondary sources and access to interview material.

The wide scope of the evaluation had placed a premium on the evaluation team's capacity to ensure that the work on the parts contributed to the evaluation of the whole. This had been done firstly through the detailed evaluation framework (the evaluation 'matrix' which was approved by the Evaluation Committee) which broke the ToR down and showed interconnections. Secondly, there had been close communication, information sharing and cross fertilization across the wider evaluation team.

Internal quality control of the evaluation had been through internal peer review, centralized oversight and the use of an independent reviewer, Professor Allen Schick. The evaluation process had been developed to ensure compliance with the principles and standards for evaluation adopted in the African Evaluation Guidelines⁴ and by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s/Development Assistance Committee (DAC)'s evaluation guidelines.

Externally, the Evaluation Committee, which commissioned and had oversight of the evaluation, set up an international and a national network of peer reviewers to assist them in their role.

The Specific Elements that Helped make a Difference

The call for an independent evaluation was put out to public tender, and Oxford Policy Management Limited of the United Kingdom was awarded the contract. The evaluation team was assisted by a Government Technical Evaluation Committee composed of representatives of various Ministries supported by an International Reference Group of experts composed of representatives of the donors.

The final draft version of the independent evaluation of the PEAP (1997-2007) was presented at a national stakeholder workshop, led by the Office of the Prime Minister and presided over by its Minister for General Duties. Over two hundred and fifty representatives of Government, including representative of more

than seventy districts (CAOs and District Planners), the private sector, non-governmental organizations and development partners attended. The major draft findings and recommendations of the evaluation were presented, and issues to be addressed in the final revision to the evaluation report were identified.

The final evaluation report was submitted by the independent evaluators on 25 July 2008, and circulated across Government and to other stakeholders. Following this, the Office of the Prime Minister organized a series of one-day workshops from the 15-18 September 2008 to review the key findings and recommendations, and initiate the preparation of a Government response. The Government response to the independent evaluation of a major policy, such as the PEAP, is considered standard good practice, ensuring that the Government's views on the report are made known, and that then Government acts on the recommendations that it agrees with. Each one-day workshop targeted a different Ministry or Agency to focus discussions on the issues most relevant to a particular group. Over one hundred and twenty representatives of Government, and targeted representation from the private sector, non-Governmental organizations and development partners, participated in one of the four workshops.

Management and Quality Assurance

To ensure proper management and quality assurance of the evaluation; the Government of Uganda set up an evaluation sub-committee to lead the designing of the Terms of Reference, overseeing the selection of the consultants, reviewing the

evaluation process and products, and disseminating the findings and lessons.

A Reference Group was also formed to provide independent and expert opinion on both the evaluation design and quality of evaluation products. A team of experts acted as a buffer between the Reference Group and the evaluators, to ensure stability and progress in the exercise.

Internal quality control of the evaluation was through internal peer review, centralized oversight and the use of an independent reviewer. The evaluation process has been developed to ensure compliance with the principles and standards for evaluation adopted in the African Evaluation Guidelines and by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s/Development Assistance Committee (DAC)'s evaluation guidelines.

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What Would have Happened Without the Evaluation?

- The establishment of the Government Evaluation Facility on public policies and major public investments building on the success of PEAP evaluation would not have taken place.
- Serious deficiencies in the coordination of Government business by the Office of The Prime Minister and its oversight which the

evaluation highlighted would not have been identified.

- The role of the office of the Prime Minister in overseeing service delivery and monitoring and evaluation would have remained deficient if the PEAP evaluation was not done. The office of the Prime Minister has now exercising full control in coordinating monitoring and evaluation in government as recommended in the PEAP evaluation.
- The PEAP evaluation resulted in a successor National Development Plan (2010/11 – 2014/15) with the theme “Growth, Employment and Social-Economic transformation for prosperity”. The effects will continue to be seen as the National Development Plan is implemented and monitored.

Further Reading

Albert Byamugisha and David Rider Smith, Office of the Prime Minister: Giving national direction through evaluation: Uganda's evaluation of its Poverty Eradication Action Plan (1997-2007), July 2011.

Office of the Prime Minister: Independent Evaluation of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) 1997 -2007, Volume 3: Government White Paper, August, 2009.

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
Essay
Contest
Winner
3rd Place

Real World African Evaluations in Africa

—that made a Difference

An Alliance for the Sustenance of Peace and Socio-Ecological Management in the Niger Delta in Nigeria

Etuk Anietie



THE KEY TO sustainable growth and development in Africa is monitoring and evaluation. No effort by Government or international organizations can be assessed objectively without a comparative study of activities based on expected results in relation to actual outcomes when the activities are completed. Evaluation has also drawn attention to past government policies relating to environmental protection and human rights agreements. Case in point, government actions towards the Niger Delta people and the resulting consequences as they agitated for environmental management and for their communal rights in the proceeds from oil drilled in the region.

Despite the popularity of some of this conflict and the years of destructive consequences (key among them are the Isaac Boro 12 day revolution in 1966, Umuechem destruction in 1990, the hanging of Ogoni 9, including Ken Saro Wiwa in 1995, Odi massacre in 1999, (MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of Niger delta. NDPYF: Niger Delta People Volunteer Force). and others in the 2000s), the Government of Nigeria is yet to develop


a legally supported national model for resolving conflict, especially armed conflict, between the Government and communities/groups in conflict.

The Amnesty model currently used, with particular respect to the Niger Delta region, has recorded some level of success. It is evident that this approach was developed based on findings and evaluation reports submitted by local organization, stakeholders, partnering institutions and international organizations. It is almost certain that if the country had officially adopted and completely utilized reports submitted by committees set to look into these various crises, with a focus on sustaining peaceful coexistence nationally, the present Boko Haram issue would not have escalated to its present level. When social organizations, activists, international stakeholders, communities, even the Government, study and understand the factors underlying and fueling these crises, their quest for peace will be more successful, and once this model works, it can then be replicated and expanded to enable implementation in other African countries and in the world.

Evaluation of the Agitations of the Niger Delta People and the Response of the Federal Government of Nigeria

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. It is a key player in African regional peace issues and

policy formulation, a member of many international peace and sustainable environment organizations.



What baffles many is that despite these international affiliations, the country, in most of its dealings with its local communities, takes actions that are paradoxical to its international stand. The local issue that will form the basis for this evaluation study is oil exploration, exploitation, environmental degradation, deprivation, the subsequent conflict between the local people and the Government and its 'active' response to the problem.

The local agitation for a fairer share of proceeds from oil wealth and for other environmental issues in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria garnered momentum when on 23 February, 1966, a group of armed militia, mostly Ijaw youths led by Isaac Jasper Adaka Iboru, declared the Niger Delta Republic and fiercely battled with Federal forces. Iboru and his compatriots were captured, jailed for treason, granted amnesty and later enlisted into the Nigerian Army. No known enquiry was conducted.

In 1990, in Umuechem, Rivers State in Nigeria, rioting youths protesting environmental pollution and neglect of their town by oil producing companies abducted 3 policemen sent by the Government to keep the peace in the area. A police response left twenty-five people dead and six hundred and fifty buildings reduced to rubble. The physical result of the enquiry was the approved compensation of N10 million by the Federal Government and N2 million by the State Government to the people of Umuechem.

Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders were hanged on 10 November, 1995, for speaking out

against the environmental damage to the Niger Delta caused by oil companies through their 37 years of drilling in the region. These men were the earliest members of MOSOP (*Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People), which advocated for the rights of the Ogoni people. These executions reached a peak through a set of uncontrolled violent actions that erupted in Ogoni in 1993. In the chaos that followed, it has been alleged that twenty-seven villages were raided, resulting in the death of two thousand Ogoni people and displacement of eighty thousand people. International reactions to the executions were swift. The Commonwealth suspended Nigeria for more than three years, while more than a dozen countries, including the United States, recalled their Ambassadors. No known investigation was conducted until years later.

Recently I visited Odi, in Bayelsa State. I was shocked to see that after 13 years, the people of this community are yet to recover from the military



The key to sustainable growth and development in Africa is monitoring and evaluation. No effort by Government or international organizations can be assessed objectively without a comparative study of activities based on expected results in relation to actual outcomes when the activities are completed.

bombardment that left the village desolate. In November 1999, Ken Nneweira, led a gang that killed twelve policemen which eventually led to the massacre in Odi village in Bayelsa State. In this case, the Federal Government invoked its powers, the military trucks arrived, and in a sweep, the whole village was leveled; only a church and a

bank survived the operation. Over three hundred villagers were reported killed. The Odi massacre became a national outcry, yet nothing happened. The fact remains that outright military action, without an opportunity for negotiation with people agitating for their legitimate right is considered a crime against humanity.

Our Investigative Effort


When in the late 2000s, we witnessed the tension rising again—involving militant groups in the Niger Delta, and the forces of the Federal Government—and the ensuing escalating violence and the environmental destruction, the company* (*name withheld for legal reasons, but the company is a major training partner in the Niger Delta Amnesty Program) I worked with decided to evaluate the methods used by the Government in resolving the conflict in the different cases discussed. This was with the aim of comparing the outcome of each case, with an overall view of establishing whether these outcomes conformed with international standards.

We assumed that investigations were conducted after each case, and that the reports of the investigations were presented to the Government for utilization. Our task was to assess whether these investigations and reports were impartial, and, if they were not, to what extent the Government used the findings to preempt, manage and even stop future civil unrest and anti-social occurrences.

To carry out a non-conservative evaluation of the crisis in the Niger Delta region, we embarked on the study from three dimensions: (i) the Federal Government of Nigeria; (ii) the oil producing communities in the Niger Delta region, and (iii) the oil service companies in the region.

The Federal Government, in its tough approach to the agitations of the people in the Niger Delta, whether peaceful or violent, has maintained an attitude characterized by threat, coercion and manipulative subjugation. In the different cases cited above, the story has been as follows: (i); the people gather to express their grievances (peaceful or with arms); (ii) the military, police or other law enforcement agents arrive at the scene, beat, arrest, or kill the people; (iii) compensation is paid as settlement to the people; and (iv) the case is closed.

This method has not only been unproductive, it has also created a society filled with mistrust and fear, where people can no longer express themselves publicly. Over the years, the Federal Government has created many agencies to manage Niger Delta



affairs, but the outcomes of these agencies have been under the direct control of the same Federal Government. This then leads to the question, who reports to whom? This is the simple reason why none of these agencies ever functioned to the expectation of the Niger Delta people. Examples include the defunct Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF), and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). Our study shows that the people of the Niger Delta are not completely satisfied with these agencies. In response to this dissatisfaction, the people of the Niger Delta have resorted to setting up armed groups to fight back. Key among them are: the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Niger Delta Vigilante Group (NDVG). The more the force applied by the Federal Government, the more resolved the people become to challenge the Federal Government.

The Initial Model we Developed

The new model, which is now integrated and repackaged into the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme (NDAP), has been adjudged the best step government, the communities and the companies have taken towards the benefit of all the parties involved.

Our analysis so far proves that, before now, the heavy-handed response by the Government's security forces had only fuelled further violence. This

The communities have tried in different instances to approach the government for dialogue, but the outcome of most of these discussions have not been beneficial to these communities as a whole, and, in most cases, the decisions taken were not implemented; and where they were implemented, no monitoring or evaluation to tell if the impact expected was actually achieved. The armed militia groups have resorted to violence, vandalism, kidnapping, oil bunkering, etc. The outcomes of these actions neither benefit the communities, nor the government. The peaceful and non-violent groups in the communities have responded with activism, and open condemnation of government policies.

The companies have not been fair to the communities. It was not until recently, after many years of neglect and as a result of international criticism, that these companies have become socially responsible.

cycle of attacks and counter-attacks between the different sides have been marked by unlawful violence, with devastating consequences on human life, socio-economic development and oil production in the country. For example, results from NNPC show that during the conflict period, production of oil reduced to an average five hundred thousand barrels per day between 2006 and 2008. Compare this result to the 2.6 million barrels per day realized in the post amnesty regime around 2010.

The new model adopted by the Government has seven key phases—dialogue, disarmament, reorientation, rehabilitation, capacity development and empowerment, reintegration and feedback.

The dialogue process paved the way for communication, discussion and negotiation between the government and the agitating party. This allowed both sides to fully understand and appreciate each other's expectations. Once the negotiations are signed, the next step for peaceful collaboration starts with disarmament, especially of armed militia groups. After this, the ex-militants then go through a period of reorientation and rehabilitation

in a special camp away from their area. This takes a period of weeks and topics discussed include social capital, negotiation, conflict resolution, socio-economic development, personality development and other personal development learning. The participants are then posted to different training and education institutions and companies with an aim to equip them with specific trades skills, especially in oil and gas industries, and entrepreneurship capabilities. The reintegration process is a way to help them reintegrate into the society. The feedback system is aimed at evaluating, assessing and redeveloping the NDAP programme.


The Challenges of the Evaluation Process

- **Available Data:** The Government does not have relevant statistics or data to use; results of previous studies were not readily available to use in the analysis. Apart from this, in most of the cases that we studied, no investigation was carried out to ascertain the actual cause of the problem, and the level of destruction resulting from the crisis.
- **Legal Backing:** It was difficult for the legal system in Nigeria to adopt a policy supporting the Niger Delta region alone. This is because of the diversity in religious and ethnic beliefs, language, culture and traditional differences. These differences cut deep into almost every system in Nigeria, and impact the policy formulation process.
- **Trust:** The people do not trust the government; this challenge has undermined many efforts for peaceful resolutions. The people still fear that if at the end of the negotiation they reject the government's offer, it might still resort to former known methods.

What we Proposed based on the Evaluation Findings

We accept the model used by the current Amnesty Programme. This new proposed model is designed to make the amnesty model more robust so that it

can accommodate other ethnic groups in Nigeria, and that such a fully functional model can be used in other countries in Africa.



- **Open Communication** (Dialogue and Negotiation). The first step in any conflict resolution process is to establish communication between the parties. This will enable both parties to understand and appreciate their grievances, build trust and realize each other's expectations.
- **Conflict Management Body.** Introduce a body to manage data, evaluate the project implementation process and use the results to study and develop new strategies. An example is the NDAP, however, the only issue with the NDAP is that it focuses mainly on the Niger Delta. A national body with the capacity to manage conflict that arises from any part of the country needs to be established.
- **Investigation and Evaluation of Crisis.** Since we did not have any organization or agency that studied or analyzed past conflicts in Nigeria, it was difficult to arrest some salient situations even before they occur. Knowing the volatile situations of communities in the country, the conflict management office should also have a special monitoring and evaluation unit/institute. The aim of this unit would be to reduce conflict occurrence in Nigeria by using investigation, analysis, and evaluation to develop pre- and post-conflict strategies. This unit will ensure impartiality in its analysis and findings, high standards and best strategies must be used to get high quality results. Financial accountability and openness with information will ensure public trust and goodwill. Monitoring, feedback and evaluation

should be integrated to create an improvement-enabled unit.

- Government should set up legal systems that fully back these agencies. Government should also adopt and implement policies and solutions proposed by research and investigation committees, because it is only when the results of these committees are utilized that we can then evaluate the outcome compared to other alternatives.

By this, I strongly believe that no government can improve without evaluation. Africans have goodwill, Africans know what it takes to make Africa a better place, but the key to sustainable peace, development and growth in Africa, in Nigeria, in the Niger Delta, is monitoring of project implementation efforts, analysis of strategies used, and evaluation of outcomes based on strategies used.



The conflict management office should also have a special monitoring and evaluation unit/institute. The aim of this unit would be to reduce conflict occurrence in Nigeria by using investigation, analysis, and evaluation to develop pre- and post-conflict strategies.

The State of Program Evaluation in Cameroon: An Overview by a Practitioner

Debazou Y. Yantio, Cameroon Development Evaluation Association President



Introduction

EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING has moved to the top of the development community agenda, prompting massive interest from academia and development practitioners about rigorous (impact) evaluations of development interventions. The essential idea of this paper came from an input to an OECD process to put together guidelines for joint evaluations (OECD, 2005).

Evaluation is often associated with monitoring, but this paper specifically focuses on the former. It discusses the state of evaluation of public projects,

program, and policies in Cameroon. The aim is to make a diagnosis and recommend actions to strengthen the country's evaluation capacity. This is necessary for the country to own and lead development processes for the welfare of the entire society.

According to Segone et al (2012:17), evaluation capacities empower stakeholders—from national governments to civil society organizations—to question, understand and take charge of necessary changes to development processes as and when evidence indicates policies, programs and projects can be more successful. Evaluation capacities include the power to set the evaluation agenda and to determine what is evaluated and what questions are asked (OECD, 2011). In other words, they are the abilities of people and organizations to define and achieve their evaluation objectives (OECD, 2006) at three interdependent levels: individual, institutional and the enabling environment (Heider, 2011:89). These three interrelated evaluation capacities function together to demand, supply and use evaluations (Segone et al., 2012:20; Newman et al., 2013:2).

Evaluation capacities empower stakeholders—from national governments to civil society organizations—to question, understand and take charge of necessary changes to development processes as and when evidence indicates policies, programs and projects can be more successful.

Segone et al (2012:17)

Evaluation principles of independence, credibility, and utility are three equal sides of the triangle at the center of which the quality of evaluation rests. They need to be integrated with measures that go beyond the individual to span the institutional framework and the enabling environment. These principles are markers of high-quality evaluation and ensure good practice in evaluation (Heider, 2011:87).

Efforts to build and sustain effective national evaluation systems face several challenges, including institutional design, political dynamics, limited technical skills, poor access to tools and resistance to change (UNDP, 2012:5). From the perspective of the Cameroon Development Evaluation Association (CaDEA), the country's association for professional evaluation (VOPE), the capacity development model for Cameroon aims to provide measures to strengthen evaluation capacity at individual, institutional, and environmental levels.

Findings reported in this paper are based on direct observation of evaluation practices at individual

The Enabling Environment

This section scans the factors that have significant implications for program evaluation. These factors shape the demand for evidence by offering policymakers the incentives or disincentives to access and use research [and evaluations], and to strengthen the necessary capacities to do so.

There is a growing social demand for government to demonstrate results as well as a demand for greater accountability by donors (Rist, Boily and Martin, 2011). This holds true for Cameroon. First of all, the pressure of public opinion on governments—in donor countries; pressure from international financial institutions, and of the latter on

and organizational levels as well as of the conditions of the enabling environment prevailing in the country as evidenced in the public statements of officials, existing and completed program documents, and institutions. Analysis of a cross-section of search results from Google Scholar has also provided evidence to support the views discussed in this paper.



The paper is organized into six sections. Following this introduction is the institutional and political background of program evaluation in the country. The paper then discusses, in turn, the enabling environment, evaluation capacity at the levels of individuals and organizations, and the market for evaluations and evidence for policymaking. It concludes with some suggestions for the way forward to more and better evaluations and evidence-informed policymaking in development.

aid recipient countries to manage for results and provide evidence of the effectiveness of development interventions at project, program, and policy levels is ever increasing. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed on March 2, 2005, in Paris, France, which the Government of Cameroon is a signatory of, is the formal face of this international pressure.

The event came two years after the country reached the decision point of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and other donors. Under the HIPC, a sizeable amount of money collected from debt relief mechanisms

was channeled to development investment, especially in poverty reduction interventions. It was expected that this massive affluence of development investments would translate into more program evaluations. The expectation was not met. Civil society organizations and donors were pushing the government to set up a participatory mechanism for monitoring and evaluation of interventions funded under the HIPC initiative. Unfortunately, this initiative was not fruitful.

The foreseen M&E system didn't come to life for unknown reasons. Instead, there were process evaluations and audits; poverty monitoring was annually carried out, relying solely on the National Institute of Statistics (INS), the official agency of the government. Note that poverty monitoring is different from the evaluation of the HIPC program, which is not explicitly warranted in the official Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

As evidenced in Carden (2009), it obvious that as they prepare and adopt public policy (including evaluation systems), politicians and officials [broadly policymakers] in Southern countries are under considerable influence of external players, namely international financial institutions and major aid donors.

Against the backdrop of increased demand for accountability and effectiveness, the central government is progressively transferring powers to local governments—at the regional and municipal levels, pursuing Decree n° 2004/017 of July 22, 2004 on decentralization in Cameroon. This Decree states in Section 2, Article 2, that “Decentralization shall constitute the basic driving force for promotion of development, democracy, and good governance at the local level”. This Decree sets up two monitoring organs: a national decentralization board (Section

78, Article 1) and a local services inter-ministerial committee (Section 79). Despite the provision of Section 66, Article 1 that “The State shall ensure the supervision of regional and local authorities in accordance with the provisions of this Decree”, it further states that the national decentralization board “shall be responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of decentralization”, without specifying the role of the local services inter-ministerial committee.

This necessary clarification of roles is left to the implementation decree to come. While it is clear that the object of monitoring and evaluation of the national decentralization board is the implementation of decentralization—that is, finding how far decentralization has gone—what about the monitoring and evaluation of development policies, programs and projects decided and implemented by regional and council jurisdictions? Given the usual weaknesses decried at the level of municipal administration, there is space for capacity building, which is being filled by the National Community Driven Development Program (PNDDP)¹, a multi-donor initiative of the government of Cameroon, the World Bank, the *Agence française de développement* (AFD), and the Kfw.

The increased pressure from international partners on the central government and the growing potential demand at local government are checked by the absence of an evaluation culture and insufficient knowledge at all layers of the public administration. Evaluation is often confused with audit and supervision as evidenced in the various decrees defining the organization of ministries. There are inspectorates reporting directly to the minister, with compliance, auditing and supervisory roles.

1 PNDDP web site : www.pnddp.org

On the ground, these inspectorates usually fulfill administrative oversight at most, as they don't have the right human resources to engage in rigorous internal evaluation of the policies, programs and projects of their respective ministries.

The organization of inspectorates doesn't guarantee enforcement of Heider's fundamental evaluation principles of independence, credibility and utility. The work of inspectors in the ministries is complemented by that of the Ministry of Supreme State Control in Charge of Auditing all Administrative agencies. Recently, an audit bench was created in the supreme court of justice of the country. It assesses the accounts of all public bodies, including ministries and public enterprises. Its report is released every year. The work of these agencies is closer to financial audit than to program evaluation, even though the latter is vaguely mentioned in their organizational statutory mandate.

In addition to the inspectorates in each ministry, there is a monitoring unit in all ministries, since the government introduced road maps as planning tools in 2004–5. The unit monitors the implementation of the road map of the ministry it belongs to and reports to the Secretary General, the head of the administration in the ministry, who reports directly to the minister. Only the Ministry of Economy, Programming & Regional Planning (MINEPAT) has established evaluation units within its administrative set up, especially within each directorate.

Evaluation Capacity at the Level of Organizations

When they are carried out, evaluations tend to be designed to serve the information needs of donors, overlooking the needs of national and local institutions and beneficiaries. Evaluations are generally

Since 2007, the prime minister's office has a technical adviser in charge of a program to introduce results-based management (RBM) in the public administration. It is dubbed PROMAGAR, with designated focal points in line ministries. They were trained in RBM and have ministry-wide action plans that they implement.



One of the National Assembly's missions is to control governmental action. Oral "written" questions to the government during parliamentary sessions and parliamentary investigation commissions outside the sessions are the main vehicles of this control. Rigorous evaluation of governmental policies, programs, and projects is not yet common practice.

Between the government and the National Assembly is the Economic and Social Council, the knowledge broker and consultative forum in national policymaking processes. It gathers eminent scientists and technocrats, but it is apparently inactive, and has made no significant contribution to governmental policies for decades.

How has this environment shaped evaluation at the institutional level?

commissioned by donors. When they are commissioned by national counterparts, it is more to fulfill their contractual obligations than to learn and improve organizational performance in delivering



Unmet policy expectations of the private sector during dialogue with the government has brought the Groupement interpatronal du Cameroun (GICAM), the most powerful syndicate of employers, [in the country] to engage in evaluation of some policies, mostly those with tax implications.

the expected outcomes to target groups. Monitoring and evaluation systems are not designed to provide credible answers to the evaluative questions of program staff, beneficiaries and other national stakeholders. This situation doesn't encourage demand for evaluations, not to mention rigorous evaluations in the ministries and public agencies. Almost all donor-funded development programs and projects in the public sector have steering committees. Civil society and target groups are often part of these committees. However, they focus more on recruitments, annual budgets, and monitoring program implementation. Mid-term reviews and final evaluations are tabled before the committee as required in the program memorandum of understanding to serve donors' information demands. Although monitoring and evaluation reinforce each other, they are often mixed up, resulting in ineffectiveness. Identifying and attributing positive impacts (or success) to a specific intervention where evidence is not supportive enough to ascertain effectiveness is common place, because of methodological flaws

in evaluations. In addition, this mix up tends to put the emphasis on monitoring, which is considered by many as supervision and auditing, therefore nurturing disinterest and resistance of program implementation staff.

Evaluation assignments advertized in newspapers are scheduled in duration rarely up to one month. They are often dubbed impact evaluations, but careful examination of the expected results clearly shows they are process evaluations, and that assessment of program impacts is not a feasible option given the context and resources available. This situation is explained by either insufficient evaluation capacity within the commissioning organizations, a need to fulfill just the requirement of the donors, or both.

Unmet policy expectations of the private sector during dialogue with the government has brought the Groupement interpatronal du Cameroun (GICAM), the most powerful syndicate of employers, [in the country] to engage in the evaluation of some policies, mostly those with tax implications. To our knowledge, GICAM has not commissioned evaluation of specific public programs or projects. However, this organization has a huge potential in advocating program evaluation in the government by exercising pressure. The government always seeks to display a vibrant public-private dialogue, and to obtain the favor of international financial institutions.

How does the environment at the national level and in organizations shape the practice of evaluation at the individual level?

Evaluation Capacity at the Level of Evaluators

Most evaluation teams are led by expatriates, usually from Europe and North America, the

major donors. This is the result of aid contracts which require that the principal contractors be

a national of the donor country. In the best-case scenarios, national evaluators are left with the options of partnering with firms or individuals recruited in the donor country, playing roles like field appointment organizers and data collectors, with little or no contribution to evaluation design and reporting. The political regime in the country and its power relationships with donor countries put an unfavorable bias on local evaluators (Yantio, 2012)². However, one should acknowledge that while qualified professional evaluators exist in the country, they are rare species in the development community. A review of the quality of evaluation reports commissioned in 2008 by a major UN agency has revealed that most of this work across Francophone Africa did not pass the minimum threshold to get into the database of evaluations to be disclosed to the public³. This result certainly holds true for Cameroon. However, the educational background of most of those who claim “I am an evaluator” is high enough to allow a quick and successful refresher course on evaluation principles and methods in order to carry out credible and influential program evaluations. There are several

training organizations in the private and public sector that provide undergraduate and professional training in M&E, although with inadequate curriculum, teaching resources, and learning conditions.



In general, evaluators are isolated. Even when they know each other, they seldom have a forum where they can network, share experiences, and learn. Fortunately, the situation is changing with evaluationcameroon@yahoo.com, the electronic listserv that the Cameroon Development Evaluation Association has put in place. Conferences organized by international evaluation associations like the African Evaluation Association (AfrEA), the International Development Evaluation Association (IOCE), and others, offer opportunities to network through scholarships. International training programs in the North, where most professional evaluators are trained, also provide networking windows.

The Demand for and Supply of Evaluations and Evidence for Development Policymaking

What program evaluations were conducted in the country as a result of the interplay of evaluation capacities and incentives/disincentives of the environment? The evaluation capacities at the individual and institutional levels interrelate with the enabling environment to determine the market for evaluations and evidence for development policymaking. Their interrelationships include inherent complementarities and tensions. They


function together to demand, supply and use evaluations (Segone et al., 2012:20) The following exhibit from Newman et al. (2013:2) graphically illustrates the factors that shape this market. Even though the supply factors at the level of individuals is not articulated enough in this framework, it gives an inspiring overview of key variables to work on in promoting evaluations and evidence-informed policymaking in a national perspective.

² For more details on barriers to the professional development of individual evaluation consultant, see Yantio, Y. D. (2012)

³ The report of the assignment is covered by confidential agreement between the consultant and the agency.

Under the structural adjustment program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World

Exhibit 1: Factors in the process of evidence-informed policy making



Bank (since 1987), evaluation of macroeconomic policies by the staff of these institutions has been

common. To name a few, there was “Dutch disease” of the oil industry, liberalization of agricultural produce marketing, public finance and fiscal reform. The findings of some of these evaluations were controversial since some saw the underlying hypotheses as unrealistic and not adapted to local conditions. In general, the public is unaware of these macroeconomic impact evaluations shelved in Washington, D.C.

CaDEA intends to move beyond the seminal roles of experience sharing, mutual support and learning of organizations of evaluators (Quesnel, 2006) towards an active role in promoting and mainstreaming evaluation in development decision making in Cameroon.

A quick Internet search with Google Scholar reveals that most evaluations are in the health sector, and in macroeconomic impact analysis.

The Way Forward

As discussed earlier, evaluation capacities are placed in the context of good governance and development effectiveness. Good governance creates an enabling environment for evaluation, and evaluation reinforces good governance, accountability and overall effectiveness of development efforts (Heider, 2011:99; UNDP, 2012:4-5).

CaDEA intends to move beyond the seminal roles of experience sharing, mutual support and learning of organizations of evaluators (Quesnel, 2006) towards an active role in promoting and mainstreaming evaluation in development decision-making in Cameroon.

In doing so, we are building on Heider's tips for developing evaluation capacities:

1. Connect national evaluators together and provide them with opportunities for professional exchanges and career development.
2. Carry out a diagnosis (SWOT) of existing capacities to find entry points and draft explicit strategies for evaluation capacity development as a response to challenges and use existing and emerging opportunities.
3. "Drive from within" by identifying champions and engage them to influence other key policymakers.
4. Set standards as benchmarks that can be used to convince other stakeholders about the importance of the evaluation principles and measures to safeguard them.
5. Set professional standards and good practice standards.
6. Develop and implement professionalization, accreditation and credentializing systems.

CaDEA's 2012-2014 plan is underway to implement the above evaluation capacity building strategy and promote evidence-informed policymaking in Cameroon.



Debazou Y. Yantio is a policy and development evaluation specialist. He holds an M.A. in Economic Policy Management (2001). Since 1994, he has participated in or led program evaluation-related missions in several countries across Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America. He has provided evaluation consulting services to major UN agencies, multilateral development institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. President of the Board of the Cameroon Development Evaluation Association (CaDEA), he is also affiliated with several evaluation associations. He has published several book chapters and articles in professional journals.

He now manages Monitoring & Evaluation for the Congo Basin Ecosystems Conservation Support Program of the Economic Community of Central African States. ■

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Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

Completed Evaluations



Did you know? OPEV has Completed the Following Evaluations

Project Level Evaluations

- Public Sector Project Completion Report Evaluation Notes (PCREN)
- Private Sector Expanded Supervision Report Evaluation Notes (XSREN)
- Sector Lessons Learned Synthesis
- Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER) Public Sector
- Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER) Private Sector

Sector and Thematic Evaluations

- Independent Review of the AfDB's Non-Sovereign Portfolio
- Environmental Mainstreaming, Safeguards and Results: Bank Road Projects and their Enabling Policy Environment, 1999-2010
- Trust Fund Management at the African Development Bank, Phase 1
- Agricultural Water Management: An Evaluation of the African Development Bank's Assistance in Ghana and Mali, 1990-2010
- Evaluation of the African Development Bank's Policy-based Operations
- An Independent Evaluation of the African Development Bank's Assistance to Fragile States (1999 – 2010)
- Mainstreaming Gender Equality: A road to results or a road to nowhere? An Evaluation Synthesis
- Fostering Regional Integration in Africa: An Evaluation of the Bank's Multinational Operations, 2000-2010
- Evaluation of Public Financial Management Reform in Africa

To get a copy of these evaluations, visit the AfDB website (operationsevaluation.afdb.org), or write to OPEV (opevhelpdesk@afdb.org)

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

Completed Evaluations

Environmental Mainstreaming and Safeguards

OPEV HAS COMPLETED this independent evaluation, which reviewed environmental mainstreaming, safeguards, and results in the road subsector at the AfDB considered the extent to which regional member countries (RMCs) have taken up environmental concerns and mainstreaming and reviewed the sustainability of environmental outcomes.

About the evaluation

Title: Environmental Mainstreaming, Safeguards and Results: Bank Road Projects and their Enabling Policy Environment, 1999-2010


Evaluation Team: Detlev Puetz, Chief Evaluator, Girma Earo Kumbi, Senior Evaluator, and a team comprising former OPEV staff and consultants.

This evaluation report combines an assessment of environmental mainstreaming, safe-guards and results of AfDB road projects with analysis of the environmental policy and institutional framework at the Bank and in three regional member countries.

Key question: How have RMCs taken up environmental main-streaming and how has the Bank supported the process?

The road subsector was selected for this evaluation because it pioneered the application of environmental and social safeguards and mainstreaming in Africa.

Most conclusions from this evaluation apply to roads. However, observations and findings allow more general conclusions on enhanced management of environmental main-streaming at the Bank, at both the project and policy levels.



Findings


Environmental results

The evaluation shows the following:

- environmental results in roads are best where RMC systems work well.
- The short-term environmental outcomes of Bank-supported roads were by and large satisfactory ; however, the quality of long-term environmental road management and maintenance was often deficient.
- Induced secondary environmental damages from road construction - such as deforestation, unplanned land settlements and loss of bio-diversity - are rarely mitigated through project and sector interventions.

Environmental management at the Bank

- The technical quality of the Bank's Environmental Impact Assessments and Management Plans for roads, as submitted with Project Appraisal Reports, was found to be satisfactory. However, some projects could benefit from more effective alignment of the Bank's safeguards and Environmental and Social Management Plans with those of RMCs and other donors.



- Environmental monitoring and supervision by the Bank are weak. The Bank's monitoring and evaluation framework, supervision records, and Project Completion Reports do not provide a comprehensive picture of environmental results and short-comings for individual road projects or the subsector as a whole.
- Strategic Environmental Assessments for countries and sectors are considered an important entry point for environmental mainstreaming; however, are underused by the Bank and countries.

Environmental achievements and use of country systems in regional member countries

- Three country case studies and the evaluation literature review and interviews show that RMCs have made substantial progress in environmental policies since the 1990s. However, enforcement structures and procedures often remain weak.
- Donors have contributed substantial resources to enhance the image and mainstreaming of environmental issues in RMCs.
- Country systems are being used for environmental safeguards, but legal obligations require continued Bank engagement.
- Many RMCs find it difficult to reconcile different donor demands for environmental safeguards, management and procedures.

Environmental mainstreaming at the Bank

- The Bank's approach to environmental mainstreaming and support for country systems has not worked well.
- Responsibility for environmental mainstreaming is not clearly assigned at the Bank. First, everybody's business and then nobody's business?

Main message from the evaluation:

Environmental mainstreaming and safeguards work best when country systems are strong and staff is motivated. Consequently, the evaluation recommends

- enhancement of the Bank's support to regional member countries for good planning;
- implementation of project environmental safeguards and management plans;
- selective activities to strengthen country sector and national environmental capacities for long-term sustainability and secondary project effects;
- improved institutionalization of mainstreaming at the Bank to provide catalytic support for environmental awareness in regional member countries; and
- show-casing environmental mainstreaming and partnering with RMCs, regional economic communities and civil society organizations. ■

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

In Pictures: The Mainstreaming Evaluation



Photo 1 - Erosion on the Kabale-Kisoro road in South-western Uganda

Short-Term Environmental Outcomes and Sustainability

“In some projects, good environmental practices were less respected, resulting in environmental nuisances for local populations and wildlife. Such impacts included poorly managed water flows, sloppily compacted soil deposits, and threats to wildlife and biodiversity. For instance, in the Kabale-Kisoro road project in the mountains of south-western Uganda, environmental concerns turned secondary when the project faced major delays and cost over-runs. Problems at this location included missing protection measures for a rare species of endemic birds, erosion control (photo 1), the placement of the asphalt plant and slow restoration of borrow pits and quarries that were no longer in use”.



Photo 2 - The Marrakesh-Agadir highway in Morocco, a showcase for good environmental management

“... Yet, on balance, most road projects showed satisfactory environmental sensibility; with some performing quite well, such as a highway project in southern Morocco (photo 2). For the Marrakech-Agadir highway, the Bank took the environmental lead early among three parallel-financing donors. Among others, the Bank insisted to re-afforest a sizable number of valuable arganniers trees that had to be cut down for construction. Re-afforestation was successfully done by the executing agency “Autoroutes du Maroc”



Long-term secondary, induced environmental impacts are rarely sufficiently analyzed and mitigated

Little effort is made to follow-up on environmental effects after project completion. The country evaluation teams came across many of the classic long-term benefits of roads, such as growing commerce, settlements, agriculture, and enhanced mobility. But such developments, particularly those in Cameroon and Uganda, also had such adverse environmental side-effects as uncontrolled land-grabbing along new roads, loss of forests and bio-diversity, and settlements in wet lands. Such induced long-term environmental road impacts as land use changes and deforestation (photo 4) are well known and reported, but they are neither an integral part of project environmental assessments or mitigation planning at the Bank or in countries




Photo 4 - Firewood sales on the Ngaoundéré road in Cameroon: indicative of roads' long-term effects on land use and deforestation

Long-term environmental sustainability

“In contrast to short-term outcomes, environmental sustainability beyond project completion is clearly unfinished business. Regional member country funding for ex-post routine maintenance and environmental mitigation measures is very limited and few donors are willing to invest. Evaluation field visits came across several long-term environmental problems, from decay of environmentally important road construction features to secondary effects of deforestation or disturbance of wild-life, particularly where sustainability after project completion was not taken into account. The Mélong-Dschang road in the mountains of north-eastern Cameroon, completed in 2006, is a case in point (photo 3). The road has



Photo 3 - Environmental maintenance is needed on the Mélong-Dschang road in Cameroon



many well-constructed, reinforcing gabions and stone walls to prevent erosion and damage from its steep slopes. But other sections of the road already need strengthening, five years after completion.


The evaluation team saw severe and damaging erosion problems, in the form of loose soil deposits,

not well compacted and with poorly managed water flows. The road also passes through parts of a protected forest and animal reserve, whose degradation by all accounts has increased as a result of the road and the lack of appropriate ex-post mitigation measures.

Recommendations

The Bank should do the following:

1. **Collaborate more interactively with its RMCs on the design of environmental project impact assessments and safeguards; to develop clear, coherent, and actionable environmental management plans for Bank-supported road projects, particularly when co-financed with other donors.**
 - 1.1 Follow country environmental processes and requirements to the extent possible.
 - 1.2 Work towards consolidated, joint, and fully agreed environmental management plans at project launch, under country leadership.
 - 1.3 Formulate and limit Bank environmental safeguards when revising the Bank's safeguard system, in all relevant Bank policy and project documents; to include only safeguards that carry legal or due diligence implications for the Bank.
 - 1.4 Improve Bank communication on environmental safeguards with regional member countries to enhance transparency and predictability through up-to-date on-line systems and relevant expertise in country and regional offices.
2. **Support and strengthen RMC execution and enforcement of environmental safeguards and management plans for roads during project implementation, particularly in environmentally sensitive and high-risk projects.**
 - 2.1 Help countries systematically include and monitor environmental provisions and budgets in project construction contracts and related procurement documents.
 - 2.2 Strengthen environmental attention within country systems by enhancing Bank reporting requirements on environmental issues in quarterly progress reports and supervision missions.
 - 2.3 Prioritize environmental supervision based on environmental risks by better categorizing



projects as environmentally high-risk, and by clearly indicating and flagging projects and areas of particular environmental sensitivities for follow-up and supervision in logical frameworks and Environmental and Social Management Plans.

- 2.4 Consider new and expanded Bank environmental support and supervision modalities for environmentally sensitive projects, such as specialized environmental implementation assistance by sector operations departments and targeted environmental compliance monitoring and country audits by the Safeguards Division.
- 2.5 Use risk-targeted supervision, implementation support, and environmental compliance monitoring to raise awareness and enhance know-how and capabilities of country implementing institutions for environmental supervision and enforcement.

3. Strengthen regional member countries' long-term sector and national environmental capacities. Bank support should be selective and mindful of available resources, capabilities, and instruments.


- 3.1 Expand environmental diagnostic and strategic sector analyses in accordance with the Bank's environmental policy and emerging vision on green growth, in close collaboration with regional member countries.
- 3.2 Enhance environmental management during road maintenance through stronger

engagement with countries in infrastructure maintenance programmes.


- 3.3 Mitigate more long-term induced environmental project effects through strategic sector work to manage long-term environmental effects and related institution building.
- 3.4 Support environmental institutions and training in countries and regions to raise awareness about environmental values and principles, mainstreaming, and safeguards.

4. Assume a stronger, pro-active, catalytic, and values-oriented responsibility for environmental mainstreaming in Africa, thus reinforcing the Bank's long-term strategy of sustainability and green growth, taking into account financial and technical resources for the environment.

- 4.1 Institutionalize environmental mainstreaming at the Bank to better address its "upstream" orientation.
- 4.2 Pioneer and show-case environmental mainstreaming in some flagship programs.
- 4.3 Increasingly partner with regional member countries, regional economic communities, co-financiers and civil society organizations on environmental matters to identify environmental solutions and strengthen environmental values, policy implementation, enforcement and capacities.
- 4.4 Introduce appropriate indicators and mechanisms for regular monitoring and reporting of Bank environmental performance.



*Did you know?
Evolution of Environmental Policies and Institutional Arrangements at the African Development Bank*



Independent Review of the AfDB Non-Sovereign Portfolio

Is the Bank doing the right things with respect to its stated objectives of promoting private sector development (PSD) in its RMCs? And is it doing it in the right manner, in terms of instruments, procedures, resource utilization, and institutional set up?

These are some of the issues addressed in OPEV's recently completed evaluation of the Bank's private sector operations. The redacted evaluation report will be made available following CODE's discussion of the evaluation (along with the management response). The assessment is expected to provide critical guidance for the implementation and possible improvement of the new policy strategy for PSD as well as the formulation of a new three-year business plan for private sector operations.

Evaluation Team: Rakesh Nangia, Director, OPEV; Mohamed Manai, Division Manager, OPEV; Grace Kyokunda, Chief Evaluation Officer, OPEV; Hadiza Guimba, Principal Evaluation Officer, OPEV and external consultants ■

Completed

Trust Fund Management at the African Development Bank

The Operations Evaluation Department has completed the first phase of its review of trust fund management at the AfDB. This first phase focused on 'procedural effectiveness' of trust fund implementation. A second phase will evaluate effectiveness, impact, and results.

The impetus for this evaluation was concerns expressed by donors, the Bank's Board of Directors, Management and staff and recipients. Issues raised concerned perceived delays in the processing and implementation of trust funds and related activities, and the ensuing substantial reputational risk and its impact on confidence in the Bank and future contributions. This evaluation is timely. In addition to addressing these current issues, the evaluation is expected to provide key inputs to decisions as the Bank is considering organizational options for trust fund management and future directions for resource mobilization.

This phase of the evaluation does not address issues of development effectiveness or impact of the funds but rather the "procedural effectiveness" of their implementation, though procedural effectiveness has implications on development impact.

The evaluation attempts to determine the scope and scale of the procedural issues; distinguish at what stage in the process problems are most critical; and identify causes of the problems and the implications for policy, process, organizational structure and human resource reforms.

The evaluation report will be made available following discussion by CODE.

Evaluation Task manager: Detlev Puetz, Chief Evaluation Officer ■

Completed

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

On-going Evaluations

Evaluation of the African Development Bank's Efforts to Strengthen Institutions in the Governance Area

THIS EVALUATION AIMS to help the Bank achieve its objectives in the governance area and improve its efforts to support the capacity development of governance institutions – such as ministries of finance and audit institutions, procurement bodies -at both country and regional levels. Capacity is one of the major constraints facing governments across the continent. Capacity development is a complex process. It takes place on multiple levels and is very much influenced by context. Achieving sustainable capacity development has been a challenge, not only for the Bank. This evaluation is designed to draw on the Bank's and other organizations' experiences to help the AfDB improve its results in this area.

Emerging findings

A portfolio review, evaluation literature review, comparative analysis of the Bank's approach and four case studies have been completed. Strong findings are beginning to emerge from these case studies and reviews. OPEV is continuing to work closely with stakeholders to examine the practical implications for the Bank's work in this area. This will include meetings with operational colleagues to discuss the emerging findings and help tailor useful recommendations for the final report, which is expected to be discussed by CODE in September 2013.

Task Manager: Penelope Jackson, Principal Evaluation Officer, OPEV ■

Joint Evaluation of Climate Investment Funds (CIF).

OPEV'S JOINT EVALUATION (with other Multilateral Development Banks) on the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) has been completed. An interim report is expected for May 2013 followed

by country studies and a final report by the end of 2013.

Task Manager: Detlev Puetz, Chief Evaluation Officer, OPEV ■

Follow-up of Recommendations of the Joint AfDB/IFAD Evaluation on Agriculture and Rural Development: OPEV is finalizing a report on the AfDB's and IFAD's implementation of recommendations in the 2009 joint AfDB/IFAD evaluation of

agriculture in Africa. The final report is expected to be ready by end November, 2013.

Task Manager: Detlev Puetz, Chief Evaluation Officer, OPEV ■

Evaluation of the ADOA Framework

At the request of Senior Management, OPEV has launched an evaluation of the ADOA (Additionality and Development Outcome Assessment) framework. **The evaluation** aims to assess the extent to which the tool (i) responds to the results and development outcomes framework for private sector operations; (ii) has helped in informing the decision-making process; (iii) has been an effective screening tool in improving private sector projects design; and (iv) has the appropriate screening methodology compared to other MDBs.

This evaluation comes at a critical time when a revised ADOA framework is under preparation. Within the Bank's context of accountability for results, the study will draw relevant lessons from accumulated knowledge gained from implementing the ADOA framework since 2008, and provide appropriate recommendations for improving the performance of ADOA.

Task Manager: Hadizatou Sidikou Guimba, Principal Evaluation Officer ■

Fostering Inclusive Growth in Africa: An Evaluation of the Bank's Microfinance Policy, Strategy and Operations, 2000-2012

OPEV HAS LAUNCHED an independent evaluation of the Bank's microfinance activities. The evaluation aims to draw lessons from the Bank's past and current experience to inform the Bank's vision and strategy in this area. It is also expected to provide input on how the Bank can enhance the delivery and implementation of microfinance activities in its RMCs.

Specifically, the evaluation aims to critically assess the following:

- The clarity and relevance of the Bank's microfinance policy and strategies; the strengths of the structures, processes and capacity to implement the strategy.

- The effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of microfinance projects.
- The Bank's organizational performance as well as country and beneficiary institutions' performance in mainstreaming, designing and implementing projects and in sustaining the results.

The planned completion date for the evaluation is end-September 2013. A results dissemination seminar will be organized in early October and will provide an opportunity for other development partners in microfinance in Africa to also share their experiences.

Evaluation Task Manager: Eneas Gakusi, Chief Evaluation Officer, OPEV. ■

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

On-going Evaluations

Kenya Country Strategy Paper (CSP) Evaluation

OPEV HAS LAUNCHED a quick turnaround evaluation of Kenya Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) at the request of the East Africa Regional Resource Centre (EARRC). The purpose of this forward-looking evaluation is to support the development of the new Kenya CSP by sharing lessons and recommendations based on a quick assessment of past performance. The next CSP is scheduled to be presented to the AfDB Board during the third quarter of 2013.

The evaluation seeks to assess the key pillars of the CSPs, such as: Infrastructure for growth (roads, water supply, energy and business development); employment for poverty reduction (rural livelihoods, youth and vulnerable groups and skills development). In terms of cross-cutting themes, it will focus on governance and regional integration while also addressing gender, environment and climate change. It will also address the theme of 'inclusive growth' in the Bank's Medium Term Strategy (MTS) from a forward-looking perspective to inform the new Kenya CSP since this is a new area for the Bank.

In addition to broader evaluations questions, the evaluation will address the following specific questions: Have the Bank's strategies been aligned with Kenya's national/sectorial development strategies and have they addressed the appropriate country developmental priorities and needs/issues? How did the Bank's portfolio of projects perform? What results were achieved through CSPs and to what extent do these correspond to those planned? What were the successes, constraints and lessons? How can the lessons be used for the next CSP? Were the interventions sustainable in terms of national ownership, capacities developed and institutional/policy changes?

The reference period for the evaluation is 2002 to 2012, corresponding to the preceding three CSPs for the periods 2002-2004, 2005-2007 and 2008-2012 respectively.

Evaluation Task Manager: Seetharam Mukkavilli, Chief Evaluation Officer, OPEV



Evaluation of the AfDB's Assistance to Botswana, 2004-2013

THE SECOND EVALUATION of the Bank's assistance programme for Botswana has been launched by OPEV. This rapid evaluation is meant to inform the design of the next CSP for Botswana (2014-2018), which is already under preparation.

The Southern Africa Regional Resource Centre (SARC) expressed a desire to learn from the design, implementation and results of the two previous CSPs.





Botswana CAE (cont)

This evaluation is meant to fulfill the two inter-related evaluative information needs of the Bank's Senior Management (SR), SARC operational staff and Board, as well as of the Government of Botswana. It will provide information on the design quality, implementation quality and results of the 2004 and 2009 CSPs, and complement the findings of the previous evaluations and reviews.

The evaluation will also address issues raised in previous evaluations and reviews. These include the strategic mix of lending and non-lending operations, the instruments employed, and the results (both intended and unintended) achieved for the Bank's assistance to Botswana.

Evaluation scope and questions: The evaluation will cover the Bank's 2004-2013 lending and non-lending assistance in Botswana during the implementation period of the 2004 CSP and 2009 CSP. The lending assistance will cover both loans and grants while the non-lending will include the strategies, policy dialogue and advice, knowledge management and partnership development. The evaluation will focus on the priority areas of the 2004 CSP and 2009 CSP, comprising financial market development; private sector development; and infrastructure development. It will also cover cross-cutting issues in the two CSPs, including gender equality, environment improvement, regional integration and capacity development.

Did you know?

The first evaluation of the Bank's assistance programme in Botswana was conducted in 2002. It covered the 1973-2000 period. Between 1992 and 2004, the Bank had no operations in Botswana. It re-engaged with Botswana in 2004, with the preparation of its 2004-2008 CSP (2004 CSP), followed by its 2009-2013 CSP (2009 CSP). The present evaluation covers the Bank's 2004 and 2009 CSPs –the 2004-2013 period.

The main objectives of the evaluation are to

- Assess the strategic relevance of the Bank's 2004 and 2009 CSPs
- Assess the extent of the achievement of the objectives of the Bank's 2004 and 2009 CSP and the factors that facilitated or limited the results
- Assess the extent of the contribution of the 2004 and 2009 CSPs to the national development outputs, outcomes and goals of Botswana
- Draw relevant lessons from the performance of the Bank's 2004 and 2009 CSPs in order to provide actionable recommendations, especially for improving the design, implementation and management of the Bank's new CSP for Botswana



Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

On-going Evaluations

Evaluation of the Bank's Assistance in the Transport Sector

THE GOAL OF the evaluation is to inform the future strategic and operational directions of the Bank's assistance in the transport sector. It aims to do so by identifying emerging trends in the sector, assessing how the Bank has responded to these trends, taking stock of the results of the Bank's assistance and drawing lessons for future work.

The evaluation combines the two objectives of (1) accountability—by assessing to what extent the Bank has contributed to the development of the transport sector in RMCs—and (2) learning—by identifying lessons on how the Bank can contribute most effectively to improving its RMCs' transport sectors.

Key Evaluation Questions

The questions focus on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the Bank's operations in the transport sector.

- **Relevance:** How relevant are the Bank's transport-related policies to the Bank's ability to respond to the needs of recipient countries and other clients?
- **Effectiveness:** What is the contribution of the Bank to the transport sector of RMCs?
- **Efficiency:** Is the Bank's assistance efficiently delivered?
- **Sustainability:** To what extent has the Bank's assistance in transport contributed to sustainable results?

Food for Thought

Deficient transport infrastructure and high transport costs in Africa constitute some of the most serious obstacles to the competitiveness of business, the delivery of social and economic services, and intra-regional trade. Africa's transport infrastructure continues to lag behind that of other developing regions.

High transport costs and prices a serious predicament: Indeed, the gap in transport costs between Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world has widened significantly over the last decades, resulting in transport prices in Africa that are 40%–175% higher than the world average (Gaël Raballand and Patricia Macchi. 2009. Transport Prices and Costs: The Need to Revisit Donor's Policies in Transport in Africa. World Bank).

The transport and logistics system "deficit" has played a role in making African countries, particularly those in Sub-Sahara, among the least competitive in the world.

Source: OPEV Transport Evaluation Approach Paper



Did you know?

Snapshot of the Bank's Engagement in the Transport Sector

Bank's Investment Operations: The Bank's financing of transport infrastructure programs has increased significantly over the last decade, especially from



3.5 billion UA - total commitments between 2009 and 2011 (exceeding the commitments for the nine previous years, from 2000 to 2008)



135 - the number of transport sector projects approved since 2000, of which 109 (81%) were in the "Road Transport/Highways" sub-sector

78% - (of the total) the share of total loans for road transport and highways projects, as expressed by the Net Loan amount

70% - Road transport and highways projects account for 70% of total transport sector project cost.

In all but one case (a sector budget support in Morocco), the Bank has used investment lending.

The Bank's Transport Sector Projects by Year (Left) and by Sub-Sectors (Right)



Evaluation Team: Hajime Onishi, Principal Evaluation Officer, Girma Kumbi, Senior Evaluation Officer, Bilal Bagayoko, Research Assistant

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

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OPINION

Transportation in Africa

Does it Matter if Benefits stop?

Mafalda Cunha, Consultant, AfDB Operations Evaluation Department

The African Development Bank (AfDB) has invested heavily in road transportation networks over the last few years. However, three evaluations completed during the last three years suggest that road transport projects should incorporate more measures to ensure the sustainability of these investments and that country stakeholders need to do more to improve the sustainability of their road infrastructure.

This article draws on three evaluations of road sector operations to discuss sustainability in road projects. It examines the factors that constrain the continuation of benefits of these road projects given that because the benefits generated tend to disappear, one may wonder whether the projects contribute to long-term development.

First, a few definitions:

Sustainability: According to the OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria adopted by the AfDB, the concept is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.

Development Objective is the intended impact contributing to physical, financial, institutional, social, environmental, or other benefits to a society, community, or group of people via one or more development interventions (*Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*).

One of OPEV's functional responsibilities is to independently evaluate the performance of completed projects and selected on-going projects to assess their outcomes and impact on the economic and social development of regional member countries. This culminates in the preparation of a Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER). Since at project completion, the costs of operations and maintenance and benefits are still unknown, the Bank Group considers that post-evaluation is undertaken only after the project has been in operation for about two to three years, when a meaningful evaluation of performance is possible. Project sustainability is one of the evaluation criteria assessed in conducting a PPER.



Evaluation, in this context, can help assess whether the outcomes of development projects are sustainable and consequently help assess whether a development intervention was successful.

Sustainability in transport development projects matters. More than ever, development in Africa depends on sustainable transport infrastructure, which plays an important role in economic and social development.

The importance of the transport sector in Africa is reflected in the Bank's involvement in this sector over time and by the considerable number of transport projects in the Bank's projects portfolio. This is underscored by the recent focus on this sector in the AfDB's Medium-Term Strategy, 2008-2012, which recognizes infrastructure, including transport, as one of the selective operational focus. Consequently, and to ensure that the benefits of these projects continue beyond project completion, it is important to draw lessons from previous projects that may benefit future projects.

During the last three years, OPEV completed three project performance evaluation reports on the transport sector, specifically on the road sub-sector:

- Lesotho: Mpharane-Bela Bela Road Upgrading Project (2011)
- Benin: Project to Upgrade the Cotonou-Porto Novo Road (2010)

- Botswana: Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project (2011)

All three PPERs were rated unsatisfactory (on a four-level scale: highly unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, satisfactory and highly satisfactory) on the sustainability criteria. The ratings took into account six main factors considered to affect the sustainability of projects: technical, financial, social, institutional, political and environmental factors.

The main findings of these evaluations suggest that the factors that constrain the project sustainability of these three projects and support these unsatisfactory ratings stem from:

- Inadequate levels of funding for maintenance and limitations in institutional capacity in the case of Lesotho. There is insufficient cost recovery from road users to make a contribution towards rehabilitation of the road and there is shortage of qualified staff at Roads Directorate for planning and maintenance works.
- Weaknesses in terms of road network management caused by slow decision making in the case of Benin. There is an inappropriate annual budget cycle for operational maintenance needs. Also, insufficient awareness in the field of road safety and the conditions for preserving road functionality threaten sustainability. Lastly, limited contribution of road users to maintenance costs was also identified as a factor that constrains project sustainability.

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

Opinion

- The creation of an autonomous Road Fund and Roads Authority was not implemented in the case of Botswana. There are inadequate levels of funding for maintenance. There is lack of a dedicated source of funding for road maintenance as funds are received from the recurrent budget of the central fiscus. Further, the determination of cost recovery is aggravated by the fact that Botswana does not have a dedicated road user charge system. Lastly, there is weak institutional capacity due to shortage of qualified staff and some of the available traffic data is inaccurate and therefore hampers planning activities by the Roads Directorate.

This analysis indicates that the two common factors that affect the sustainability of these transport projects are financial and institutional.

Financial sustainability: all these projects encountered a similar situation regarding road funding and management. Cost recovery from road users is insufficient to cover maintenance needs. A common issue for them is how to recover the maintenance costs.

This analysis indicates that allocating regular and sufficient funds for road maintenance is a necessary condition for ensuring project sustainability. Furthermore, this allocation must be based on a sound road maintenance program.

Institutional sustainability: The Lesotho and Botswana projects encountered limitations in the capacity of the Road Authority Directorate that continues to be constrained by the lack of appropriately qualified human resources. How to manage adequate institutional capacity on planning, and executing road maintenance works is a key issue to be solved.

In this case, it was concluded that adequate institutional capacity and expertise of the Road Departments on planning and executing road maintenance works is another necessary condition for ensuring projects sustainability.

Measures that address these issues must be incorporated into the AfDB's transport projects, and country stakeholders should do more to improve the sustainability of road infrastructure. Furthermore, the trail of these interventions should be monitored and assessed over time to ensure that the outcomes of these projects are completed and sustainable. Otherwise, the vast sums spent funding these operations would be in vain, with no value-added in the long term. No sustained benefits. No roads for development.


OPEV is currently conducting a Cluster Evaluation on Roads Upgrading Sustainability. It is expected to provide important findings and lessons in this area.

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

On-going Evaluations



Coconut husks thrown by vendors into the lateral drainage ditch and quite advanced vegetation—a problem linked to lack of awareness and poor maintenance.



View of a road at night. No lights. The operator of the toll/weighing station, who also manages the lighting, blames the energy and electricity company, since power does not reach the electrical equipment box of the lighting network.

Mafalda Cunha is a junior consultant in the Operations Evaluation Department of the AfDB. She previously worked in the public and private sectors in Portugal in such areas as financial, healthcare and information technology. She holds degrees in Economics as well as in Financial Audit and Management Control. This article was written with the collaboration of Hajime Onishi, Principal Evaluation Officer. ■

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

Behind the Scenes: Evaluation Community of Practice in Action

Evaluation Community of Practice

It was a busy quarter for the AfDB Evaluation Community of Practice (ECoP). —It held five, well-attended, face-to-face events. Evaluation staff, non-AfDB experts and Bank staff had opportunities to share knowledge through presentations and conversations on evaluation and development issues. The five events were

1. Current Efforts to Strengthen the Evaluation Architecture of the Inter-American Development Bank
2. Financial Inclusion for the Poor: Why it Matters and Where we are in the Journey
3. The Project Completion Report (PCR) Review Process
4. The Best Practice Standard Methodology
5. Quality at Entry

Mark your Calendars!!

Upcoming ECoP Meetings

- Working with Consultants May 2013
- Discussion/Debate: OPEV's Independent Review of the AfDB's Non-Sovereign Portfolio May 2013
- Knowledge Sharing Event: Country Assistance Evaluations June 2013

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Evaluation Community of Practice

Evaluation Community of Practice Discussion

Evaluation Architecture of the IaDB

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 2013; 12:00 – 1:30 PM.

Let's talk: Current Efforts to Strengthen the Evaluation Architecture of the Inter-American Development Bank

Guest speaker: Cheryl Gray, Director of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) at the Inter-American Development Bank

Session chair: Rakesh Nangia, Director, OPEV

Evaluation, for learning and accountability, is an important part of development work. At the AfDB, evaluation comprises self-evaluation—and independent evaluation—conducted by the independent Evaluation Department (OPEV). This ECoP session focussed on how evaluation is organized in other MDBs – in this case, the IaDB—and what the AfDB can learn from the IaDB's experiences. It was an engaging and well-attended session that is expected to inform AfDB efforts to strengthen its evaluation function.

Viewpoints

I have no background in MDBs as such. My background is in Transport Economics, with 5 years consultancy experience in developed countries. I therefore had many things to learn when I came to the AfDB: Developing countries and their numerous unique challenges, the functioning of an MDB and finally the role of evaluation within this framework.

What has become especially clear over the two and a half months I have been here is that the position of an evaluator requires a set of skills that are rather unique: the ability to quickly and efficiently understand the context of a particular project, the ability to set up a certain assessment framework, and, finally, the ability to be fair yet critical in the assessment framework.

I am working on a thematic evaluation: the sustainability of road projects through the assessment of 10 road projects. This is therefore the evaluation type I know the most about. However, through chats here and there, I have also learned about project evaluations and country program evaluations.

Today's talk gave me a clear overview of the different types of evaluations I already knew about as well as some I hadn't heard of. I also learned about their strengths, weaknesses and challenges and the best practices that can be applied to each type of evaluation.

I commend the openness shown by OPEV and the Bank in general. Never have I seen so much openness to constructive criticism and best practices. I guess being in the Evaluation department explains this, although not entirely.

Vincent Flament holds a Masters degree in Transport Economics from the University of Leeds, UK. He started his career at a transport consulting firm in London, then moved to Washington DC in 2009, continuing his career in the field of transport. Pursuing his increasing interest in development, he accepted a junior consultant position at OPEV in 2012. The understanding acquired at the Bank and on the field has convinced him to continue working for Africa, specializing in economic development through better transportation links.

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

Evaluation Community of Practice

Evaluation Community of Practice Discussion

Let's Talk: Financial Inclusion for the Poor: Why it Matters and Where we are in the Journey

FEBRUARY 14, 2013

Guest Speaker: Tilman Ehrbeck, CEO of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)

Session chair: Rakesh Nangia, Director, OPEV

OPEV has launched an evaluation of the AfDB's microfinance operations. In this context, a team from CGAP visited the AfDB, where it made a presentation on financial inclusion to AfDB Executive Directors (informal board session) and Bank staff (a Let's Talk session organized by the AfDB Evaluation Community of Practice).

The talk and discussion was led by the CEO, Mr. Tilman Ehrbeck, who was accompanied by Mayda El-Zoghbi, Head of Donors & Investors Team, and Corinne Riquet, CGAP's regional representative based in Abidjan.



The talk focused on:

- Why financial access matters for the poor;
- Evolving paradigms: microcredit, microfinance, financial inclusion, financial access;
- Increasingly robust impact evidence;
- Progress and opportunities going forward; recent developments and innovations in the African context;
- Opportunities other MDBs and DFIs are leveraging and how they are doing so;
- What it takes to be an efficient institution providing support to microfinance; and
- Efforts being made to coordinate international support for microfinance in Africa.

Mr. Tilman's presentation was followed by a lively debate about microfinance. There was consensus that while the poor need access to diverse financial services, the delivery modalities still remain a daunting challenge. Also, rigorous impacts of microfinance on the poor are still limited by increasing. They are not yet conclusive.



ECOP Discussion on Financial Inclusion

OPINION

Micro Finance Q & A: CGAP

A team from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), led by CEO Tilman Ehrbeck, visited the AfDB on February 14 and 15, 2013. The team briefed the AfDB Board of Directors on developments and opportunities in the broader field of financial access for the poor and had a lively discussion with AfDB staff (thanks to the AfDB Evaluation Community of Practice).

THIS ARTICLE IS a follow-up memo prepared by CGAP to address comments and questions raised during their presentation to the AfDB Board of Directors.

The issues and answers are grouped under three broad headers:

- **Better understanding the needs of the poor** who are economically active and today use a wide range of informal financial mechanisms that tend to be unreliable and can be very expensive
- **A systems view for developing inclusive, local financial systems** that serve the poor and help them capture economic opportunity and reduce vulnerabilities and thus improve their lives
- **How different actors can catalyze the development of inclusive, local financial systems**, including the role of government domestically and the role of international funding institutions such as the AfDB.



I. Better Understanding the Needs of the Poor


Several Directors cautioned that it was important to not view the poor as recipients of charity, but as economic actors who are precluded from capturing opportunities because of a numbers of barriers, including, but not only, lack of access to reliable, low-cost, formal financial services. A comprehensive body of research and literature concurs with this view. Globally, half of all jobs are in the informal economy (World Bank World Development Report, September 2012). Poor households globally have to fend for themselves, not by choice but by necessity. In economic terms, they fall, at once both between the categories of “producers” and “consumers”. As such, they need a broad range of financial services (access to working capital for livelihoods, savings for consumption smoothing, insurance for risk mitigation, payment systems). The financial diary literature (for example, Collins et al., 2009) has shown that poor households are active users of a broad range of financial services, typically the old-age mechanisms of borrowing from family and friends, the money lender, the pawnbroker, through savings by using rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs or “ton-tines” in French) stay cash under the mattress and

by sending money through informal remittances networks, amongst others.

Against this reality, several specific comments and questions are noteworthy:

- **Informality is not a long-term solution.** How can we shift the poor from the informal to the formal sector? In the long-term, formal, sector economic growth is desirable. However, for the foreseeable future, informality is a fact of life and poor households need to fend for themselves. The less formal the job and the less social protection in health or old-age, the more the poor need access to financial mechanisms.
- **The very poor need to be approached differently.** “What is the experience of the CGAP in developing models for very poor people (below the poverty line)?” The very poor need help to get going and to “graduate” into sustainable livelihoods (see “*Power of Hope*” blog). Several models exist, such as the *Graduation Model*, first developed by BRAC in Bangladesh that works with the poor through direct transfers, mentoring and other support to help them transition to sustainable livelihoods. In Africa, pilots are being conducted in several countries including Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya.
- **Create a savings culture in Africa.** Savings is both good from a macro-economic perspective but also important to serve as a safety net at times of household shocks. Despite misperceptions, there is a culture of savings across Africa reflected by the importance of financial cooperatives. In some regions, a significant portion of this savings is placed in informal vehicles (ROSCAs, susu collectors, livestock, jewellery, etc.) Data from Findex shows that there is significant variance across the continent in terms of access to formal accounts as compared to saving using other methods.

Figure 1: Findex data on savings in Africa



“
The required capabilities and competencies for providers on the supply side vary significantly across financial services.

- **Expand rural outreach and address spatial inequality.** According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), there are at least 500 million smallholder farming households (representing approximately 2.5 billion people) relying to various degrees on agricultural production (including crops, livestock and fisheries) for their livelihoods. The food price crisis of 2007-2008 caused the development community and national governments to refocus on agriculture within the context of the broader development goal of food security – with a focus on smallholders, buoyed by recent evidence demonstrating an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity (Carletto et al., 2011, Eastwood et al., 2004). Building on this momentum, developing-country governments made agriculture a higher priority. Political alliances like the G20 recognized their role in poverty alleviation, organizations like the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) focused on smallholders to reduce hunger and poverty, and research centers began exploring ways that smallholders could use mechanisms like payments for environmental services to adapt to climate change.

Many CGAP members continue to make notable contributions to agricultural finance

and livelihoods development in rural areas, including AFD, Ford Foundation, GIZ, IFAD, IFC, KfW, USAID, and the World Bank. While CGAP has not historically focused directly on smallholder farmers, its members are in the process of finalizing its next 5-year strategy which has identified a work stream focused on this important client segment.

- **Importance of understanding impact.** Rigorous analysis of what works and what does not work is part of the knowledge base that helps service providers as well as the development community design and expand projects and products that serve the needs of the poor. But measuring impact can be complex and requires a clear understanding of the interventions being measured. Direct interventions at the client or household level can sometimes be measured using randomized control trials (RCTs, a methodology which best enables attribution and allows you to measure what would have happened without the intervention.¹ Indeed, early evidence from randomized evaluations at the microeconomic level has shown that access and use of appropriate financial service improves household welfare and spurs household enterprise activity, offering greater opportunity and choice to poor families. Evidence to date has shown that: (i) accumulating savings helps households manage cash flow spikes; (ii) microcredit has positively impacted the income of existing microbusinesses and diversification of livestock; and (iii) micro-insurance in the context of agricultural production increases yields and related revenue.²

1 El-Zoghbi, Mayada and Meritxell Martinez. “Measuring Changes in Client Lives through Microfinance.” CGAP, 2011.

2 Bauchet, Jonathan, et al. “Latest Findings from Randomized Evaluations of Microfinance.” CGAP, November 2011. (<http://www.cgap.org/publicationslatest-findings-randomized-evaluations-microfinance>)

Interventions that have broader market implications (such as a policy intervention, for example), are not amenable to the use of RCTs and other techniques to estimate attribution and measure progress on the system as a whole become more meaningful.³

- **Role of mobile technology in serving the poor.** The M-Pesa's experience has demonstrated that low income people can use these new channels for the delivery of financial services that in particular allow them to receive money transfers at a lower cost. In Kenya, a 2012 study showed that 72% of low income people use M-Pesa as well as 75% of non-banked people.⁴ In Tanzania, a more competitive market than Kenya has shown even more promising outcomes. Whereas in Kenya per transactions costs are \$0.30, in Tanzania they are \$0.03, making it feasible to use the payment platforms to provide even more technology-enabled services that meet the needs of the poor.⁵ See blog "*The Potential of Electronic Money for Social Good*" for a more detailed discussion.

II. A Systems view for Developing Inclusive, Local Financial Systems

Several Directors commented on the need to take a broader view of financial access for the poor beyond any one product, such as microcredit. The literature and research supports this perspective. The required capabilities and competencies for providers on the supply side vary significantly across financial services. Insurance, for example,

³ See CGAP's latest blog series on "New Direction for funders" for additional information.

⁴ See research on M-PESA: Jack, William and Tavneet Suri. "The Economics of M-Pesa: An Update", October 2010. And http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/02/27/m_pesa_ict4d_and_mobile_banking_for_the_poor_.html

⁵ Forthcoming. Gates Foundation research.



Funders have had a significant role in catalyzing development in a variety of sectors, inclusive financial systems notwithstanding. There is a growing awareness that the traditional role that some funders have taken—financing to direct retail providers—is insufficient to a systems approach to catalyzing an inclusive financial system.

requires risk pooling at actuarially-relevant size and risk diversification away from similar underlying individual risk profiles, for example small holder farmers in any one geographic region subject to the same weather exposures. No one single type of financial provider can deliver the broad range of services the poor need. Instead, an eco-system of providers is required with many touch-points and linkages to the community, fewer well capitalized and regulated entities that aggregate and manage risks, and a low-cost payment transactions infrastructure that links them. Several questions and issues can be highlighted in this context.

- **Macro impact evidence on the importance of financial intermediation.** The consensus in the literature (e.g., Levine 2005) is that that financial intermediation (the ability to mobilize savings, lower intermediation costs, allocate capital across the economy) *causes* economic growth under normal circumstances. Financial access improves local economic activity. For example, rural bank branch expansion in India accounted for approximately 60 percent of all rural poverty reduction during the period 1977-1990 (Burgess and Pande, 2005). In Mexico, research (Bruhn and Love, 2009, 2012) showed that the rapid opening of Banco Azteca branches in more than a thousand Grupo Elektra retail stores had a significant impact on the economy of the region, leading to a seven percent increase in overall income levels. In Kenya, research (Allen et. al. 2012) on branch expansion of Equity Bank, which has rapidly grown to account for more than half of all deposit accounts in the country, found that Equity’s branch presence had a positive and significant impact on local household use of bank accounts and bank credit.

At the macroeconomic level, there is a well-established literature (summarized in Levine, 2005) that shows that under normal circumstances, the degree of financial intermediation is not only positively correlated with growth but is generally believed to cause impact growth. The main mechanisms for doing so are generally lower transaction costs for the economy and better distribution of capital and risk across the economy.

However, there are some caveats. Some research indicates that the positive growth impact from financial intermediation does not hold

in economies with weak institutional frameworks (Demetriades and Law, 2006), such as poor or non-existent financial regulation, or in extremely high-inflation environments (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002). More recent work following the global financial crisis also suggests that the relationship between financial depth and growth might not be linear, but shaped like an Inverted “U” -- i.e., at very low levels of financial intermediation and at very high-levels, the positive relationship disappears (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012).

Importantly, from a poverty reduction perspective, the literature has also found that financial development under normal circumstances does not merely grow the economic pie—it also divides it more equally. Better and cheaper services for saving money and making payments allow households and enterprises to avoid the cost of barter and cash transactions, and provide the opportunity to accumulate assets, and smooth flow of income. Insurance services help firms and households cope with shocks and reduce their vulnerability to adverse situations, reducing the risk of falling into poverty. Financial development should also relax the credit constraints on the poor, who generally lack collateral, credit history, and connections.

Recent work by researchers at the International Monetary Fund documents the empirical evidence on the impact of financial development on inequality. Using the Gini coefficient⁶ to measure inequality and private credit and bank branch growth as measures of financial market development, higher income segments seem to initially benefit more from deeper financial

⁶ The Gini coefficient ranges from 0, when all households have the same income, to 1 when one household has all the income.

intermediation, but as it progresses, poorer segments benefit, too. Notably, as access increases, inequality declines sharply.

- **Access to markets.** Indeed a financial system alone cannot solve all development problems and poor people also need access to services and access to markets.

III. *How Actors can Catalyze Development of Inclusive, Local Financial Systems*

As a number of Directors noted, better understanding of needs and a systems-view of inclusive, local financial systems development, suggest both a broader ambition for those who want to catalyze change, but also requires clarity with respect to the role of subsidies. Directors raised important questions in this context.

- **Role of Government.** Indeed, as raised by several Bank Board members, the state has a clear role in putting in place the enabling environment and the incentives for a financial system to serve the needs of all citizens. Governments can also use the volume of their own transactions (such as payments for safety nets or pensions) to bring down costs and link those traditionally unserved with bank accounts. See CGAP's *blog series* on the role of government and the *CGAP paper* on the same topic.
- **Constraints to shift clients from informal to formal financial services.** The government, supported by strategic donors, can put in place incentives (laws and regulations), that can create a more conducive environment for using formal services. For an expanded discussion on how regulation can be designed to promote inclusion, see CGAP's publication "A Guide

to Regulation and Supervision". Support to enhance financial literacy of consumers can also be designed and tested. See for example, Brazil's recent experimentation with financial education.

- **Financial reforms, financial constraints in low-income and middle-income countries, in fragile states?** (Actual situation in African countries). Understanding market conditions is indeed a critical starting point for designing government and donor interventions. Findex, a global platform capturing information from 148 countries provides a picture of access to finance from a client perspective. IMF's *Financial Access Survey* provides information on the supply-side from Central Banks. For specific data on microfinance in Africa, the Mix produces an annual update report on the industry.
- **Role of MDBs (including AfDB).** Funders have had a significant role in catalyzing development in a variety of sectors, inclusive financial systems notwithstanding. There is a growing awareness that the traditional role that some funders have taken—financing to direct retail providers—is insufficient to a systems approach to *catalyzing an inclusive financial system*. MDBs, with a variety of instruments and a close influencing role with governments, have a role to play in helping governments to put in place an enabling regulatory framework. As development financial institutions with a higher risk appetite than commercial banks, MDBs can also use their private sector instruments (debt and equity) to invest in promising business models that serve the needs of the poor and through this "crowd in" private commercial actors.

For AfDB to refine its strategy in microfinance, it must take stock of what it has already contributed to financial inclusion (see below). Existing evaluations of AfDB's work in microfinance, such as the 2009 SmartAid Evaluation, have noted weaknesses in the organization's capacity to deliver on its strategy (e.g. staffing, accountability, knowledge management). CGAP recommends that the AfDB start with the OPEV evaluation before deciding on how it should adjust its strategy and internal operations.

- **Learning from what works.** Any future direction for the AfDB must start with a sound understanding of its past performance in building inclusive financial systems. The OPEV evaluation on AfDB's microfinance portfolio is a great opportunity to reflect on the Bank's historical role and to start discussions on future directions.

IV. Possible Next Steps


Thank you again for the opportunity to brief the Board. We are encouraged by the prospect of deeper and more ambitious engagement in the field of financial access for the poor by the AfDB. The current evaluation of its work in microfinance to date will yield important insights and lessons. We stand ready to facilitate a dialogue with your peers and support AfDB in its development of a revised strategy and approach to financial inclusion. CGAP and AfDB have historically collaborated on evaluations and knowledge events and we welcome continued collaboration. As a member of CGAP, AfDB can expand its participation on CGAP sponsored trainings, peer learning exchanges, and donor working groups.

Tilman Ehrbeck, CGAP CEO (tehrbeck@cgap.org)

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Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

Evaluation Community of Practice

Evaluation Community of Practice Discussion

The PCR Review process

FEBRUARY 1, 2013; 11 A.M - 1 PM; A *Brown Bag Event*

Participating experts: Foday Turay, Aoufa Ezzine; Camara Mamadi; Alphonse Gongbe; Tesfaye Teklu

Session chair: Mohamed Manai, Manager, OPEV

The Context: Reporting on project performance for accountability and for learning is a core part of the Bank's activities. This is done primarily through Project Completion Reports (PCR). OPEV is currently reviewing PCRs prepared by several Bank departments.

In this context, the AfDB Evaluation Community of Practice (ECoP) hosted a knowledge sharing event to raise awareness about the current review, stimulate discussion about project completion reporting and share lessons learned. During the session, a panel of four international experts shared insights about the Project Completion Report Review Process.

The discussion focused on why OPEV reviews PCRs; the strengths of the reporting system; the weak links of the reporting system; and what can be done to strengthen the reporting system

More than 70 engaged participants from different departments attended the event. They exchanged views on how PCR reporting can be improved. It was also an opportunity for those who know little about PCR reviews to learn about the process.



ECoP Discussion on the PCR Review Process

Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

Evaluation Community of Practice Discussion

Best Practice Standard and Quality at Entry

The Context: OPEV is assessing the quality at entry (QAE) of a sample of Bank-funded public sector operations. This second independent QAE assessment, following the first in 2009, seeks to assess (i) QAE performance, (ii) relevance, coherence and effects of the Bank's QAE reforms, (iii) factors facilitating/limiting QAE performance, and (iv) dependence of successful first disbursement on QAE.

The 2012 QAE assessment aims to help Bank Management and staff: (i) enhance and sustain the QAE performance of Bank public sector operations; (ii) account not only for the status of the QAE of operations, but also for the effectiveness of QAE reforms; and (iii) learn from the strengths and weaknesses of the reform content and process.

In the context of this quality at entry assessment, the ECoP organized two events to foster knowledge sharing about the Best Practice Standard and the quality at entry assessment.

1. Face-to-Face with Charles Chandler: The Best Practice Standard

JANUARY 22, 2012; 10.00 AM – 12 NOON

This Learning event was led by Charles Chandler, a primary advocate of the 'best practice standard' being used as one of the tools for the current QAE assignment

About the Best Practice Standard: The Best Practice Standard for Quality-at-Entry states that: A fully satisfactory operation contains a well-conceived intervention model (i.e., storyline) which (i) is designed to bring about specific, worthwhile and economic outcomes; (ii) embodies a focused and realistic strategy; and (iii) can be expected to achieve and document the expected results (outputs and outcomes) within the time frame and resources allocated to the intervention. A fully satisfactory operation also meets or exceeds the requirements of the Bank's current guidelines and procedures for projects at entry.

This quality-at-entry standard was first defined in the year 2000 as part of a study being conducted for the Asian Development Bank in Manila, Philippines. Subsequently, it has been used elsewhere, notably in the World Bank.



Inside the AfDB Evaluation Department

2. Let's Talk: Quality at Entry Assessment

FRIDAY JANUARY 18, 2013

Brown Bag Lunch

The following experts participated in the well-attended, lively and engaging discussion –

Charles Chandler (Team Leader/ Quality at Entry Expert)

Stephen Tembo (Portfolio Analyst/ Rural Development Expert)

Don Brown (Water Sector and Infrastructure, Monitoring and Evaluation Expert)

Professor Idrissa Ouedraogo (Portfolio Analyst/ Governance/ Public Financial Management Expert)

Dr. Nicholas Atampugre (Portfolio Analyst/ Human Development Expert)

The session was chaired by Foday Turay, Chief Evaluation Officer, OPEV

Quality at Entry – Being 'Fit for Purpose'

Quality at Entry (QaE) is integral to the achievement of development outcomes, but achieving high QaE across the Bank's portfolio requires creating PARs that are 'fit for purpose'. Achieving consistently high QaE requires clearly defined standards to describe what 'fit for purpose' means; such standards facilitate a shared understanding among staff across the entire organization regarding quality requirements. **These were some of the key points discussed during an AfDB Evaluation Community of Practice Meeting on January 18, 2013.**

The session was organized to facilitate knowledge sharing and enhance understanding of issues relating to the QaE of development interventions. It brought together a number of Bank Departments and a team of experts working on the second OPEV assessment of the quality at entry of the Bank's public sector operations, 2005-2012.

Summary of Key Messages:

- QaE is integral to the achievement of expected outcomes from an intervention;
- High QaE requires clearly defined standards to facilitate a shared understanding among staff across the entire organization;
- Satisfactory QaE can increase the performance and sustainability of an operation; yet,
- Considerable confusion remains across the Bank regarding the concept of quality at entry.

An operation should have a clear and credible theory of change, showing, inter-alia, how and why the strategy embedded within the operation will lead to the desired outcomes. In ensuring the desired QaE of a development operation, the design should be underpinned by rigorous situation analysis and pertinent lessons from the past.

Note prepared after the ECoP by Charles Chandler

Viewpoint

ECOP Discussion on QaE, January 18, 2013

“The session was quite informative and the deliberations well focused on the subject of the day - Quality at Entry. The questions that were posed were relevant and spot-on. My take from the meeting was that the issue of Quality at Entry is an important aspect and a major attribute to the successful implementation of any project, but also for ensuring the attainment of the desired results from Bank interventions/operations. The Bank takes QaE very seriously as a corporate obligation. It is for this particular reason that it has developed various tools over time to ensure the tracking of quality and results throughout the project cycle. QaE at the Bank as it is in other organizations is a dynamic phenomenon; whose parameters need to be reviewed over time to be able to cater for the changing socio-economic needs. This entails the revision of various quality standards and processes over time to include the new and emerging socio-economic paradigms. The Bank is aware and has positioned itself well to meet the ever-changing demands on QaE. The on-going study on QaE methodology is a clear testimony of the Bank’s resolve and commitment to refocus its attention towards taking a holistic and participatory approach for a proactive QaE in the Institution”.

*Justus Kabyemera
Chief Policy Economist, ORQR.2*

Viewpoint

ECOP Discussion on QaE, January 18, 2013

I found that the ECOP: “Let’s Talk” meeting was an excellent forum that allowed an open and frank discussion to take place on matters around the important issues of ‘quality at entry’. The participation from the Bank staff was excellent and there was a strong interest shown, both in listening to new ideas and enquiring about the experience of the guest specialists that were present. It was apparent that most were looking for ways that the Bank can learn and improve. If this is typical of the type of staff in Bank then the future looks good.

*Don Brown (water sector and infrastructure, monitoring and evaluation expert). OPEV
Consultant*



ECoP discussion on financial inclusion

Next Issue:

Knowledge Management and Development Work

—Find out what the experts have to say:

- Chris Colisson, co-author of *Learning to Fly. Practical Knowledge Management from Leading and Learning Organizations*
- Ebrima Faal, Regional Director, AfDB Southern Africa Resource Center
- Kapil Kapoor, Director, Strategy Department, AfDB
- Frannie Leautier, CEO, African Capacity Building Foundation
- Rakesh Nangia, Director, Operations Evaluation Department, AfDB
- Mthuli Ncube, Chief Economist and Vice President, AfDB
- Carla O'Dell, co-author of *Only We Knew What We Know: The Transfer of Internal Knowledge and Best Practice*
- Vinod Thomas, Director General, AsDB Evaluation Department

About the AfDB: The overarching objective of the African Development Bank Group is to foster sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional member countries (RMCs), thus contributing to poverty reduction. The Bank Group achieves this objective by mobilizing and allocating resources for investment in RMCs and providing policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts.

The mission of the **Operations Evaluation Department** is to enhance the development effectiveness of the AfDB in its regional member countries through independent and instrumental evaluations and partnerships for sharing knowledge

Operations Evaluation Department, African Development Bank
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**From Experience to Knowledge ...
From Knowledge to Action
... From Action to Impact**

